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 The purpose of this thesis is to address how and why Russia interfered in the United 
States 2016 presidential election, and to identify a larger pattern of behavior that helps explain 
this action. Though Russia’s cyberattack defies precedent with regard to Russia-US geopolitical 
relations, it comes as the latest iteration of Russian cyberwarfare and intelligence warfare on its 
adversaries. In particular, Russia’s interference in US politics grew out of the tactics and 
networks developed in “Cyber War I,” waged by Russia on Estonia in 2007, and from Russia’s 
interference in Ukrainian political systems since 2014. To accomplish its ends, Russia 
perpetrated cyberattacks on state election systems and national industry infrastructure, 
disseminated foreign and domestic propaganda campaigns, hacked the computer systems of 
political networks, and attempted to recruit American citizens as assets, particularly key 
members of the Trump campaign team.  
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“How do you respond to the greatest geostrategic catastrophe of the 20th century, which was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union? You try to preempt the collapse of the western system in the 21st 
century. And if you can’t destroy these structures militarily, you will destroy them from within.” 
-Heather Conley, author of ‘Kremlin Playbook’1  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1960, a Civic Culture study by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba examined the social 
distance between Republican/Conservative parties and Democratic/Labor parties in five nations, 
including the United States. Almond and Verba specifically analyzed inter-party marriage, 
asking respondents if they would feel pleased, displeased, or no difference if their son or 
daughter married a supporter of the opposite political party. At the time in the US, just 4 percent 
of Democrats and 5 percent of Republicans responded that they would feel displeased at their 
child marrying a member of the other major political party.2 Fifty years later, polling firm 
YouGov repeated the study, asking respondents if they would feel not at all upset, somewhat 
upset, or very upset at the prospect of their child marrying a supporter from the opposite political 
party. In 2010, 49 percent of Republicans responded that they would feel upset to very upset, as 
well as 33 percent of Democrats.3  
                                               
1 Conley, Heather. Active Measures. Directed by Jack Bryan, 2018 
2 Almond, Gabriel A., and Sydney Verba. 1960. Civic Culture Study, 1959-1960 [Computer file]. ICPSR07201-v2. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2009-02-12. 
3 Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
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The ever-increasing hyper-partisan animosity that currently embroils the United States 
did not come about by accident. We find ourselves living in the first moments of a technological 
era, where every facet of the human experience -society, politics, and economics- function under 
a completely new set of conditions. In this era, public attention and sentiment trade like a 
commodity. Accordingly, social media and the news industry act as one, a hybrid social-news 
media, operating on behalf of honest interpretations of fact and paid interests alike. Advances in 
media and technology elevate advertisement to operate, basically, with high efficiency and 
effectiveness. This comes with the cost of prefabricating the infrastructure for malignant, 
irresponsible, or calamitous influences to successfully accomplish rapid grand-scale change in 
any direction. The expedient online highways and bridges that connect advertisers to prospective 
customers are also open for malignant influences to use to corrupt vulnerable people.  
 The sociopolitical environment in the US that has so palpably changed, with marked 
increases in disillusionment towards institutions like the FBI and the White House, mistrust 
amongst communities, anger to the point of hostility towards political adversaries, and a 
newfound sense of chaos and impending doom, did not transform overnight, or by accident. 
There are industries that seek to profit off the attention garnered by social outrage. And there are 
foreign institutions intent upon conducting war not by traditional boots-on-the-ground combat, 
seeking to take down the United States by hurting its formidable military, rather via an insidious 
campaign of intelligence warfare, through which adversaries seek to achieve the destruction of 
the United States by breaking its spirit, rendering it soulless and impotent.  
There is a reason why some feel that the challenges facing the present have been felt so 
dire and that the country has never been so divided. Every time an American citizen feels less 
proud of his or her country, less united with his or her countrymen, and thus less willing to take a 
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stand for them, Russian President Vladimir Putin has won a little more, and accomplished his 
agenda. Americans do face problems of our own making, like an ineffective Congress and 
fraught international relations; however, these obstacles are nothing new, and are relatively less 
imposing threats than those looming in the buildup to World War II, or throughout the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. It is not so much a concern about the external viability of the United States, but a 
pervasive doubt about the intrinsic value of the United States as a people, set of institutions, and 
promise of a better future.  
FBI Special Agent Clint Watts outlined the five objectives of Russian “Active 
Measures,” or the Soviet-era tactics for political warfare, modernized under Putin as part of a 
Russian effort “to win the second Cold War.”4 According to Watts,  
“Russian Active Measures hope to topple democracies through the pursuit of five 
complementary objectives: undermine citizen confidence in democratic 
governance, foment and exacerbate divisive political fractures, erode trust between 
citizens and elected officials and democratic institutions, popularize Russian policy 
agendas within foreign populations, and create general distrust or confusion over 
information sources by blurring the lines between fact and fiction.”5  
What is certainly different about this moment in history is that our adversary, Russia, 
devised for the United States to fall ill with despondency and faithlessness. The United States 
suffers from the confusing, insidious acts of information warfare waged by Russia on our 
national integrity, designed to destroy us from within, weakening us by turning citizen against 
citizen to the point of our own undoing. Russian interference in the United States election system 
                                               
4 Watts, Clint. “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns” (Congressional 
Testimony to US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 30, 2017 
5 Watts, Clint. “Disinformation” 
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and infiltration of its social-news media requires an immediate effort to reform the nation’s 
information-technology infrastructure and fortify the existing protections against cyberattacks. 
In 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin activated the final steps of a years-long 
campaign aimed at the US election process. According to the FBI, CIA, and NSA, Russia sought 
to tarnish public faith in the US democratic system, aid the campaign of Donald Trump, present 
him as a more favorable candidate than his opponent Hillary Clinton, malign Clinton, diminish 
her presidential campaign, and later to set the stage for damaging her transition into the 
presidency when she became the clear frontrunner in the presidential race.6  
The tools Russia used to accomplish these ends include an amalgam of covert 
intelligence operations, like online cyberattacks, as well as overt influence operations conducted 
by arms of the Russian Government, state-funded media programs like “RT” or Russian 
Television, third-party firms and agencies, and “troll farms” comprised of paid online 
influencers.7 This operation followed in the tradition of Russia’s predecessor, the USSR, which 
also conducted covert intelligence operations and overt influence operations to affect US 
elections. However, Russia’s modern influence campaign stands out for its direct and unabashed 
maneuvers, the success it achieved (which even surpassed the expectations of its leading 
authority, Putin), and the unpreparedness of American officials and organizations to combat this 
threat. 
In the 2016 United States Presidential Election, the Russian government conducted a 
grand-scale attack through cyber-warfare resulting what journalist Craig Unger described as “the 
biggest intelligence breach in the history of the world.”8 Though the Russian interference 
                                               
6 Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 6 
January 2017. P.7. (NOTE: all page numbers referenced are from the Unclassified ICA) 
7 Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing. P. 12. 
8 Unger, Craig. “Active Measures.” Directed by Jack Bryan, 2018 
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campaign used to attack the US political system in 2016 represented an unprecedented act of 
aggression by Russia towards the US, it also served as just the latest iteration of Russia calling 
on its intricate IT network and “cybermilitia” to conduct intelligence warfare and cyberwarfare 
on enemies of the state. Russia’s cyber-network carried out attacks on foreign election systems 
and IT networks beginning in Estonia in 2007, Lithuania and Georgia in 2008, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan in 2009, Ukraine in 2014, France, Germany, and the Netherlands in 2015, Finland 
and the United Kingdom (UK) in 2016, and others.9   
Putin ordered the campaign for Russia to interfere in the 2016 US Presidential Election.10 
Russia’s interference had a multi-faceted strategy, including a news-and-social media campaign 
involving “troll armies” that disseminated propaganda, disinformation, and sought to increase 
divisiveness. The interference involved attempts to recruit American citizens as assets to further 
accomplish Russia’s agenda in the US. The interference also included a hacking operation to 
break into the computer systems of Democrat and Republican organizations and to release the 
stolen information in order to damage the campaign of Hillary Clinton and support the campaign 
of Donald Trump. It incorporated aggressive attempts to infiltrate 39 states’ computerized 
election systems, with Russian-affiliated hackers successfully stealing certain state voter 
information.11 In addition to its attempts to recruit Americans as assets, Russia also persistently 
attempted to recruit members of the Trump campaign to help accomplish Russia’s agenda.  
Lastly, Russia infiltrated the computer networks of highly critical US industry 
infrastructure, attempting to plant malware on areas of the US power grid, certain US nuclear 
generators, and in parts of other sectors key to daily life in the US. This played into the larger 
                                               
9 Swalwell, Eric. “Russia: Not Our Friend” Issues – Committee on Intelligence  
10 Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing. P. 11. 
11Riley, Michael and Jordan Robertson. “Russian Hacks on U.S. Voting System Wider Than Previously Known” 
Bloomberg Cybersecurity. June 13, 2017  
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strategy of Russia manufacturing events to substantiate the theories it fostered in Americans’ 
minds about the ineptitude of the government, the dividedness of the populace, and the chaos in 
the world. Russia manipulated the election process with the certainty of having orchestrated 
some of the key events that unfolded in the final days of the election cycle, and the possibility of 
having swayed the final election results.  
 
 
CYBER WAR I- ESTONIA, 2007 
 
 The first documented instance of cyber-warfare technologies being applied on another 
country actually occurred between Russian Intelligence and the United States in the 1990’s. In an 
effort mostly to redirect the negative coverage surrounding the War in Chechnya, ex-senior 
Russian Intelligence officer Sergei Tretyakov described, after defecting to the United States, 
having ordered officers to utilize the anonymity of computers operating in a New York Public 
Library to post or send out Russian propaganda.12 Russia demonstrated its interest in 
cyberattacks in the 1990’s, and subsequently expanded its online network of both government-
affiliated and freelance hackers and trolls into a cyberarmy through the early 2000’s. Beginning 
in Estonia in 2007, Russia set the cyberarmy loose, and began a systematic string of attacks using 
many of the same hacking strategies and computer networks. Essentially, Russia began 
deploying its cyberarmy on its rivals in 2007, and for the following decade Russia honed this 
cyberarmy into a powerful, cohesive unit.  
 Over the spring of 2007, tensions worsened between Russia and its tech-savvy neighbor, 
Estonia. Though small, at the time Estonia possessed a state-of-the-art Information Technology 
                                               
12 Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", 
Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages 194-195 
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(IT) network, a system integrated in many aspects of daily life, earning it the moniker of “E-
stonia.” Estonians could access free Wi-Fi in most areas of the country.13 Even in 2007, 
Estonia’s banking, business, education, government, entertainment, and other industries deeply 
integrated their functioning with Estonia’s IT network, relying heavily on it for day-to-day tasks. 
By 2007, Estonia used online banking to conduct 97% of all its banking transactions.14 Estonia 
was the first country to ever hold an online election, beginning a pilot program of holding 
municipal elections in 2005, the success of which led to Estonia’s electronic-vote parliamentary 
election on March 4, 2007.15  
Many Estonians harbored resentment over the half century of Soviet occupation spanning 
from the end of World War II to 1991. As Estonia’s relationship with Russia deteriorated, 
Estonian officials considered moving “The Unknown Soldier” bronze memorial, a downtown 
monument and grave-site for fallen Soviet soldiers erected in 1947 by Soviets to pay tribute to 
the Soviet Union’s “liberation” of Estonia. Anti-Estonian, mostly ethnically Russian protesters 
used the monument to rally around, and on the morning of April 26, 2007, these protesters left 
the monument to riot in the Estonian capital of Tallinn.16 That night, hackers began a cyberattack 
on Estonia’s IT network. The Estonian government moved the memorial and graves the 
following morning, which only spurred on unprecedented rioting and street violence in the 
notoriously pacifistic country for two more days. In Moscow, Russian activist groups took over 
the Estonian embassy. Meanwhile, chaos descended over Estonia’s IT network.   
                                               
13 Davis, Joshua. “Hackers Take Down The Most Wired Country in Europe” Wired Business. August 21, 2007. 
14 Kash, Wyatt. “Lessons from the Cyberattacks on Estonia” Government and computer news Journal, Volume 27, 
Issue 14. June 16, 2008. P. 26.  
15 Sheeter, Laura. “Estonia forges ahead with e-vote” BBC News, Tallinn. October 14, 2005. 
16 Davis, Joshua. “Hackers”  
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According to Lauri Almann, Estonia’s permanent Undersecretary of Defense, the hackers 
launched a cyberattack on Estonia as part of the escalation of tensions surrounding the 
monument.17 Almann described the cyberattack as having two parts, the first of which involved 
“hacktivists,” or private citizens who use online movements to achieve some end. Hacktivists on 
Russian-language websites trolled Estonia and incited other “patriots” to rally against “F--cking 
Estonian Fascists.”18 The first phase focused most on an intelligence campaign to disseminate 
propaganda to turn the hearts and minds within Estonia. Astonishingly, hackers breached the 
website of Estonia’s political party in power and posted a counterfeit letter of apology for 
moving the monument. The letter was addressed from the Prime Minister of Estonia, Andrus 
Ansip, to the Government of the Russian Federation and the Russians. Almann described this 
phase as “relatively primitive and simple,” where hacktivists were instructed by the pro-Russian 
coordinators to attack Estonian websites, primarily Estonian government sites.19 Almann noted a 
lack of manpower and energy behind this phase of the attack. That being said, national polls 
conducted at the time showed that Russians found Estonia, a country with a population of 1.3 
million inhabitants at the time, to be Russia’s main threat to its security, providing some insight 
about how Russian media likely portrayed the conflict from its side.20  
The second phase, however, vaulted the cyberattacks on Estonia to become “the first war 
in cyberspace.”21 This attack came from “botnets,” or software that hijacks “zombie” computers 
unbeknownst to their owners, linking the computers to each other and using their combined 
                                               
17Terlikowski, Marcin. “Cyberattacks on Estonia. Implications for International and Polish Security” The Polish 
quarterly journal of international affairs. v.16, i.3, 2007, P. 68-87.  
18Ruus, Kertu. “Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia” The European Institute. European Affairs. v.9, i.1-2, 
Winter/Spring 2008  
19Kash, Wyatt. “Lessons” 
20Ruus, Kertu. “Cyber War I” 
21 Mite, Valentinas. “Estonia: Attacks Seen as First Case of ‘Cyberwar’ RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. Russia. 
May 30, 2007 
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power to barrage a target system, overwhelming it to the point of incapacitation. According to 
Almann, “the notion of a personal computer is really counterintuitive. There is no such thing as a 
personal computer. Everyone's computer can be used to attack another country.”22 This 
expensive and intricate attack originated from more than 75 jurisdictions and more than 1 million 
computers internationally. It arrived in waves, disrupting Estonians’ access to news sites and 
media outlets, government communications, and commercial banks. To supplement other 
sources of funding, cyber attackers created a PayPal account to help fundraise to hire additional 
botnets. Computers from Egypt and Peru overwhelmed Estonian websites, leaving no way to 
discern and disarm the bots and zombies. This phase required sophistication, financial support 
and intellectual resources. Estonian government officials could not even put out press releases on 
the attack, as the attack compromised their government sites.  
 In response to the cyberattack in 2007, Almann outlined several strategies Estonia 
undertook to bolster its defenses for subsequent cyberthreats. These included: learn to conceal 
real throughput capacity, fortify the cyber emergency rapid-response team, plan ahead with the 
EU and NATO so they could properly assist Estonia in the event of a cyberattack, create 
cooperative agreements within appropriate industries (like banking or telecommunication) to 
come into play in the event of a cyber-emergency, create cooperative agreements between 
Estonia’s private sector and the EU and NATO to also come into play in the event of a cyber-
emergency, craft a national cyber-defense strategy to identify the most essential and most 
vulnerable aspects of that infrastructure, strengthen the underlying Internet in Estonia, increase 
connections between Estonia’s web and the global web, enhance the government e-services 
facility called X-Road, and invest in the infrastructure designed to identify and alert officials to 
                                               
22Kash, Wyatt. “Lessons” 
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cyberattacks underway. Estonia’s thorough restructuring of its computer systems in response to 
its cyberattacks provides an example of the overhaul required in many other countries with 
integrated IT systems. 
 To date, experts cannot definitively identify the coordinators of the attack. Estonian 
Foreign Minister Urmas Paet issued a statement during the cyberattack that assaults “have been 
made from IP addresses of concrete computers and individuals from Russian government organs 
including the administration of the President of the Russian Federation.”23 However, the Kremlin 
pointed out that those computers could have been “zombie” computers, hijacked by activists 
without their knowledge. Though such a grand-scale assault likely required the direction of a top 
Kremlin official or the head of a large corporation, Russia has plausible deniability and thus has 
not been charged with the attack. That being said, by 2007, a pro-Russian cybermilitia possessed 
the skills, computer power, unitability, numbers, and willingness to barrage a perceived enemy to 
Russia with advanced cyberwarfare for three weeks.  
The Estonian government quickly and effectively neutralized the second phase threat. 
Behind closed doors, Estonia’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) worked furiously 
for weeks, but it restored functioning to most portals within a matter of hours or days. Former 
police officer and director of CERT, Hillar Aarelaid, stated that in less than a week after the 
cyberattacks began, “most ordinary people noticed nothing.”24 Many governments fortified their 
online protections in the wake of this incident, including the Bush administration.25 NATO and 
the EU adapted their laws and protocols for future cyberattacks, increasing the likelihood of 
                                               
23 Ruus, Kertu. “Cyber War I” The European Institute. Winter/Spring 2008. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Cyber Attacks: An Unprecedented Threat to U.S. National Security” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. 113th Congress, 2nd Session, March 21, 2013, Serial No. 113-8. 
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sanctions and diplomatic blowback if perpetrators slip up and leave a trace of the origin of the 
cyberattack.  
Whether or not the Russian government ordered these attacks outright or indirectly, 
Russia witnessed the success of this cyberarmy’s operation, the difficulty NATO and the EU had 
with finding a ringleader and knowing how to respond diplomatically to cyberwarfare, and the 
vulnerability of other countries’ cyberdefenses. This pro-Russian cybermilitia became more 
skilled and forceful over the years, and repeatedly came to the aid of the Russian government to 
subdue Russia’s greatest enemies. These efforts include subduing domestic threats within Russia, 
like rebel forces within Chechnya.26 They also include information warfare committed by the 
pro-Russian cybermilitia on Georgia during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008,27 on Kyrgyzstan 
in 2009, on Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014,28 on France 
during the run-up to the French election in 2015, on Britain in an effort to sway the 2015 Brexit 
referendum, and on the US in an effort to sway the 2016 US Presidential Election.29 The latter 
represents a continuation of a series of mounting aggressions from which the perpetrators have 
not been deterred.  
 
CYBER WAR LABORATORY- UKRAINE, 2014-2019 
 
                                               
26 Ruus, Kertu. “Cyber War I”  
27 Cornell, Svante. “Georgia feels Russia’s heavy hand” The Guardian. Opinion. June 17, 2009.  
28 Kenneth Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, NATO CCD COE 
Publications, Tallinn 2015. 
29 Brattberg, Erik & Tim Maurer. (2018). “Russian Election Interference – Europe’s Counter to Fake News and 
Cyber Attacks”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.; Burgess, Matt. (2017, November 10).  
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Tensions between Ukraine and Russia increased in the early 2000’s. The 2004 
presidential election in Ukraine went to Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Kremlin candidate, in an 
election later ruled unconstitutional and rigged by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.30 Subsequently, 
according to Greenberg, “Ukrainian crowds in orange scarves flooded the streets to protest 
Moscow’s rigging of the country’s elections; that year, Russian agents allegedly went so far as to 
poison the surging pro-Western presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko.”31 The so-called 
Orange Revolution peacefully transferred power from the pro-Russian Yanukovych to pro-
Western Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko for two years. The 2008 financial crisis that 
spread through much of the world drastically impacted Ukraine, and by 2010 Yanukovych 
became president once again.32 Notorious lobbyist Paul Manafort helped Yanukovych makeover 
his image for this 2010 election against the incumbent Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and 
Manafort worked for Yanukovych when he led the campaign to “lock her up,” imprisoning his 
predecessor and nemesis Yulia Tymoshenko for reasons later considered “politically 
motivated.”33 Then-candidate Donald Trump famously repeated this political rallying cry about 
his rival, Hillary Clinton, in the lead-up to the 2016 US presidential election. 
Yanukovych made a campaign promise important to his subsequent 2014 victory to 
continue the process of integrating Ukraine with the EU.34 Many Ukrainians hoped to reduce 
Russia’s controls on Ukraine, and saw admission into the EU and NATO as a way to improve 
                                               
30 "The Supreme Court findings" (in Ukrainian). Supreme Court of Ukraine. 3 December 2004. Retrieved 7 July 
2008. 
31 Greenberg, Andy. “How An Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar” Wired. Security. June 20, 
2017 
32 "Ukraine crisis: Timeline". BBC News. 13 November 2014. 
33 Higgins, Andrew and Andrew E. Kramer. “Archrival Is Freed as Ukrainian Leader Flees” The New York Times. 
February 22, 2014. 
34 Andrew Higgins; Andrew E. Kramer; Steven Erlanger (23 February 2014). "As His Fortunes Fell in Ukraine, a 
President Clung to Illusions". The New York Times. Retrieved 12 March 2015. 
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standards in Ukraine and align Ukraine with the West. However, in a surprise move, 
Yanukovych instead chose to sign a treaty with Russia, deepening the ties between the two 
countries economically and politically. Yanukovych deployed riot police that night to disperse 
the crowds of students who had gathered in Ukraine’s Maidan Square, having planned to 
celebrate the night Ukraine would finally become part of Europe.35  
The riot police’s brutality towards peaceful protesters and students galvanized the 
Euromaidan protests, which roiled in Ukraine through late 2013 and early 2014, gradually 
escalating into the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukrainian protesters eventually 
accomplished their goal of ousting Yanukovych, who fled Ukraine with the help of Russian 
soldiers in the middle of the night for refuge, arriving in Russia during the early morning hours 
of Saturday, February 22, 2014.36 However, Putin took advantage of Ukraine’s moment of 
vulnerability and national fatigue. Putin later described in a documentary for Russian television 
how he issued the order at 7 a.m. on February 23, 2014 for Russian commanders to seize 
Ukrainian territory of Crimea.37 After Russians annexed Crimea, Russian-backed dissidents in 
east Ukraine took control of the territories Donetsk and Luhansk, together called Donbass. 
Though Russia repeatedly denied having invaded the territory, Russian paramilitaries were 
estimated to comprise between 15-80% of the fighters in Donbass.38 The War in Donbass is 
currently ongoing.  
                                               
35 “Ukrainian police have been provided with combat weapons – interior minister". Kyiv Post. Archived from the 
original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 21 February 2014. 
36Higgins, Andrew and Andrew E. Kramer. “Ukraine Leader Was Defeated Even Before He Was Ousted” The New 
York Times. Jan. 3, 2015. 
37 “Putin reveals secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot” BBC Europe. 9 March 2015. 
38 "Pushing locals aside, Russians take top rebel posts in east Ukraine". Reuters. 27 July 2014. Archived from the 
original on 28 July 2014. Retrieved 27 July 2014. 
19 
 
According to Wired reporter Greenberg, in its “hybrid war” of traditional physical war 
and cyberwar on Ukraine, Russia aims “to humiliate the Ukrainian government, to destabilize 
society, to give a general impression that things are going badly in Ukraine, to prevent foreign 
investment in Ukraine.”39 All this, says Greenberg, works in concert to sow a general sense of 
chaos. Greenberg relays that “[Ukrainians] believe Russia is trying to create a perception of a 
failed state. And the dysfunction that they’re able to inflict certainly contributes to that 
perception.”40 Greenberg hypothesizes that Ukraine might be a type of testing ground for 
Russian cyberwarfare, as Russia can act towards a wartime adversary in otherwise unthinkable 
ways.41 Russia’s cyberattacks on Ukraine included two attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, in 2015 
and 2016, which shut off power for hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians through malware, or 
malicious software, embedded in the Ukrainian power grid.  
The 2015 power outage was called a “phantom mouse” attack, potentially designed to 
seem especially frightening, where Ukrainian IT specialists watched themselves lose control of 
their computer mouses, which then proceeded of their own accord to shut down one grid 
company at a time. The second power outage in 2016 involved more sophisticated malware that 
automatically and simultaneously shut down dozens of utilities. Other electronic intrusions 
worked to subvert Ukraine’s transportation and financial industries, media networks, energy 
sector, political arena, and military. Cyberattacks erased data, destroyed computers, and sent 
viruses into computers that then disassembled Ukrainian technological infrastructure, in addition 
to the corruption of Ukraine’s power grid. 
                                               
39 Gross, Terry and Andy Greenberg. “Experts Suspect Russia Is Using Ukraine As A Cyberwar Testing Ground” 
Fresh Air. NPR. June 22, 2017 
40 Gross, Terry and Andy Greenberg. “Experts Suspect” 
41 Greenberg, Andy. “How An Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar” Wired. Security. June 20, 
2017 
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Greenberg pointed out that these hacking operations could also target US industries, like 
it targeted the Democratic National Committee and voting systems in the US in 2016.42 If the 
pattern shown in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine persists during Russia’s interference in US, the 
influence campaign and information warfare is just the first wave of cyberwarfare, which is soon 
followed by a cyberattack on national IT networks in the industrial and commercial sectors. This 
strategy begins with severing citizens from the lifeline connecting them, through trust and 
identification, with their national institutions. Then, when citizens are untethered and isolated, 
the attackers flip on and off the lights. This wreaks havoc and further diminishes trust in the 
ability for a nation and its institutions to provide protection.  
If Putin’s goals for the US included aspiring to kneecap Hillary Clinton’s campaign, 
promote Trump’s campaign, and mar the image of the democratic process, he has accomplished 
these ends. When phase one is complete, citizens feel a nagging mistrust and pessimism about 
their country from the ideas Russia methodically cultivated within them. Then, the strategy shifts 
towards creating real-life events to solidify and substantiate the theories citizens now hold 
against their home countries. For example, after campaigning on a message of restoring the rule 
of law and order from the hands of corrupt career politicians, pro-Russian Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovych imprisoned his allegedly corrupted predecessor, Yulia Tymenshenko, 
shortly after his election. After spreading the idea online that Ukraine cannot effectively rule 
itself without Russia, Russian malware deliberately knocked out the Ukrainian power grid.43 This 
trend shows the progression from creating a wave of ideas and beliefs to reinforcing the ideas 
and beliefs with events. 
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CYBER WAR ON AN ELECTION SYSTEM- UNITED STATES, 2016 
Russian Infiltration of the State Election Systems 
 
 Primarily, the Kremlin’s interference campaign sought to influence the 2016 US 
presidential election in order to subvert the “US-led liberal democratic order,”44 to undermine 
Hillary Clinton’s expected presidency with national contempt and political gridlock from day 
one, to promote Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders’ campaigns, and to undermine faith in the 
voting process and the validity of its results.45 Russia committed a cyberattack on the US voting 
system by rigorously testing state voting registration databases or Secretary of State websites for 
possible vulnerabilities in the code, both successfully and unsuccessfully gaining access to voter 
registration databases.46 Bloomberg News cited “three people with direct knowledge of the U.S. 
investigation into [Russian election hacking]” who stated that the Russian hackers targeted at 
least 39 state election systems.47  
The Russian-affiliated cyber actors knew how to cover up the evidence of their 
intrusions. According to the Intelligence Community (IC) reports compiled by the DHS and FBI 
and summarized by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the investigating agencies of the DHS 
and FBI obtained their evidence from information each state self-reported. This meaningfully 
increased the likelihood of an underestimation of the damages. Only some states, like Illinois, 
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provided almost full-access to investigators. In the case of Illinois, Russian-affiliated cyber 
actors gained entry to the state voter registration database, which included the voter names, 
birthdates, genders, driver’s license information, and Social Security information of 15 million 
voters.48 Other states, like North Carolina, concealed their state information, impeding the 
investigative process. Consequently, the IC noted that the “DHS has been clear in its 
representations to the Committee that the Department did not have perfect insight into these 
cyber activities.”49 Simply, there is a high degree of uncertainty that the evidence summarized by 
the Committee indicated of the true scale of the attack.  
 The Senate Intelligence Committee noted the possibility that more states came under 
attack but didn’t know it, or came under attack and overlooked the indicators.50 Additionally, the 
Committee found the DHS’s responses to these threats to election security in 2016 to be 
“inadequate.”51 The IC found it unlikely that the Russian-affiliated cyber actors altered the 
national final vote tally, but did not rule out the possibility that Russian-affiliated cyber actors 
altered the voter rolls and potentially the vote tallies of key districts in swing states. Though the 
cyber actors likely did not have the technology to change votes on a large scale, “the Committee 
notes that a small number of districts in key states can have a significant impact in a national 
election.”52 In fact, Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta claimed the 2016 election came 
down to 70,000 votes in a few key districts in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan.53  
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Crucially, according to the IC report, “in a small number of states,” Russian-affiliated 
cyber actors successfully penetrated “restricted elements of election infrastructure.”54 Once these 
cyber actors gained access, they could, according to the report, “at a minimum, alter or delete 
voter registration data; however, they did not appear to be in a position to manipulate individual 
votes or aggregate vote totals.”55 Essentially, the Intelligence Committee (IC) did not find 
evidence of Russian-affiliated cyber actors changing the results of votes, but they did find 
evidence that in some states, Russian-affiliated cyber actors had the ability to alter the voter rolls 
to edit who could vote in the first place.  
Though Floridian officials avowed that they were certain no Russian-affiliated cyber 
actors had compromised election computers, the Mueller report refuted this. The report stated 
that the FBI believed the Russian GRU penetrated the network of at least one county’s election 
computers of Floridian county government.56 Subsequently, Florida Senator Marco Rubio stated 
that in addition to accessing the voting system, the hackers also gained the ability to delete or 
alter Florida voter roll data.57 Later, Florida state officials, including the Governor and Secretary 
of State, stated that this information came as news to them, and that they still did not know which 
county had been corrupted.58 This demonstrates the lack of coordination and communication 
between key government institutions, the overstatement of state officials’ confidence in the 
integrity of their voting networks, and the understatement of the impact of Russian cyber-
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operations. This also enhances the likelihood that Russia successfully targeted and gained access 
to key districts in swing states, with unknown consequences.  
 
The Hacking of Critical Industry Infrastructure 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
released an alert on March 15, 2018 describing Russian government cyber activity since at least 
2016 that planted hard-to-find computer malware on the computer networks of “US Government 
entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and 
critical manufacturing sectors.”59 State-sponsored Russian hackers infiltrated sections of the US 
electric utility grid, accessing the controls of some US power plants, and potentially gained the 
capacity to override the existing controls and instead control components of the US power grid 
from Russia.  
The cyber actors targeted peripheral organizations like the websites of suppliers or 
quality-control specialists as “malware repositories,” which would then transfer that malware 
through their trusted connections onto the final targets, critical US infrastructure sectors, when 
they trafficked those websites.60 The cyber actors used a variety of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TPPs) to infiltrate victim networks. TPPs included the use of “spear-phishing 
emails,” or a somewhat routine and unsophisticated hacking operation involving sending the 
target emails from duplicitous users, like Microsoft Office in the US.61 In Ukraine, Russian 
hackers spear-phished Ukrainians by masking themselves as a list of military draft specifications 
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sent from the Ukrainian parliament, which journalist Greenberg asserts, “is something nobody 
can afford not to open in the middle of a war.”62 These cyber actors corrupt a network by the user 
downloading seemingly benign or official attachments.  
Another tactic included the use of “watering hole domains,” or trusted third party sites 
that the final target users habitually accessed. These sites included trade publications, sites with 
information for quality control, and others. The cyber actors often altered previously legitimate 
sites, incorporating malicious content among the otherwise reputable and safe content. Other, 
less common TTP methods included the building of credentials, network reconnaissance, 
exploitation of hosts, and targeting industrial control system (ICS) infrastructure. The report 
describes the hackers’ activity as mainly intelligence gathering, but did not rule out there being 
additional motives and consequences of the hacking.63 
Once the Russian cyber actors gained access into the secure networks of ICSs through 
TTP methods, they studied the networks through reconnaissance, moved between networks, and 
amassed information on the networks. Though the DHS and FBI report did acknowledge 
“hundreds of victims” resulting from this breach, they did not find evidence of the cyber actors 
attempting to take control of the US power grid.64 Nonetheless, according to the New York 
Times, “in interviews, American intelligence officials said that the department [through its 
report] had understated the scope of the threat.”65 Soon after the report became public, Energy 
Secretary Rick Perry raised the alarm, saying that cyberattacks are “literally happening hundreds 
of thousands of times a day.”66 These breaches are alarming and somewhat embarrassing for 
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critical and sensitive industry infrastructure organizations, like the factories for nuclear 
generators and power plants. Russian cyber actors gained meaningful intel on industry 
infrastructure, altered important website code, and potentially laid the groundwork for future 
attacks to sabotage the US power grid, through the use of less-sophisticated but well researched 
and well targeted hacking methods.  
The Russians targeted similar sectors in 2015 and 2016 to hack into the Ukrainian power 
grid, causing massive blackouts. Malware implanted on US and Ukrainian power grids and 
ICSes might lay the groundwork for future disruptions or cyberattacks on the now-corrupted 
networks. They might also serve as a deterrent, preventing the US’s extremely talented IT 
specialists from disrupting Russian IT networks. Journalist Andy Greenberg hypothesized that 
perhaps this Russian activity came as a response to Stuxnet, an advanced piece of computer 
malware allegedly created in a collaboration between Israeli and US computer scientists to 
destroy hundreds of nuclear enrichment centrifuges in Iran in 2014.67 Greenberg theorized that 
Russia might seek to “signal” that it is not to be trifled with, and that its cyber-weapons are also 
to be taken seriously.  
On March 15, 2018, the same day the report became public, the US Treasury Department 
imposed yet another round of sanctions on Russian entities, in part as a response to this newly 
discovered kind of Russian cyberattacks. However, as a Vox report pointed out, over one third of 
the subjects who the US Treasury Department sanctioned on March 15 had already been under 
sanctions by the US Treasury Department.68 Though Putin repeatedly references his desire to end 
or diminish US sanctions on Russian entities, the Kremlin’s cybernetwork appears to continue 
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undeterred by sanctions imposed by the US in response to Russian election interference. 
Monitors of the upcoming European Parliament elections in late May 2019 note an ongoing 
Russian influence operation promoting far-right candidates and general disinformation, bearing 
many of the same characteristics as Russian election interference in the US in 2016.69 
 
The Social Media Campaign 
The Propaganda Machine 
 
More people saw Russian propaganda on Facebook than would vote in the 2016 US 
presidential election. Around 138 million Americans voted in the 2016 US presidential election, 
and Russian-created posts reached at least 146 million people on Facebook’s platforms alone.70 
In the 10 weeks before the US presidential election, Twitter users saw more than 288 million 
tweets that were Russian-affiliated election propaganda. US intelligence determined that the 
process for the social media propaganda campaign began under Putin, who directed the operation 
through the Russian media network. Putin also directed propaganda through state-run or state-
adjacent organizations, like the Internet Research Agency. 
 The Internet Research Agency (IRA), headquartered in St. Petersburg, employed 
hundreds of Russians as professional trolls to spout millions of posts of pro-Kremlin propaganda 
under fake or stolen social media accounts. Though the IRA suppressed information about itself 
through employee non-disclosure agreements, several Russian media outlets claim that the 
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financier and chief executive of the organization is Evgeny Prigozhin, a close ally to Putin and a 
noted member of the oligarchy. Historically, Putin awarded Prigozhin several lucrative 
government contracts. In return, Prigozhin backed a documentary that aired on the Russian 
media network, asserting that the anti-Putin protests in 2011 were coordinated by the US 
government, who paid protesters with bribes and cookies.71 The IRA aimed to disguise Russian 
propaganda as majority opinion, or the opinion of a social media user’s social sphere. This 
secretive organization, often called one of Russia’s largest “troll farms,” posted on social media 
day in and day out. The IRA orchestrated the illusion that certain subgroups of American 
political parties adamantly held opinions that in reality were just Russian propaganda. Though 
information regarding the IRA is suppressed with employee non-disclosure agreements, it is 
believed that the IRA is financed and led by an oligarch and close ally of Putin.  
The Russian interference campaign in the United States involved several platforms and 
strategies. Russians manufactured disinformation or “fake news” by writing hundreds of 
fictitious articles on conspiracies like “pizza-gate,” which claimed that Hillary Clinton and her 
campaign manager John Podesta operated a child sex trafficking ring through a pizza restaurant.  
According to a survey by YouGov and The Economist, 17% of Clinton voters and 46% of Trump 
voters believed in 2016 that some part of the “pizza-gate” conspiracy was true.72 A “troll army” 
of paid social media avatars authored their own “fake news” articles, promoted their peers’ 
articles by commenting on them and sharing them to their fake Facebook groups, targeting 
vulnerable and interested cross-sections of Facebook. 
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The IRA, which had hundreds of employees, was only one of the many “troll farms” in 
Russia. In the New York Times Magazine’s piece on the IRA, called “The Agency,” journalist 
Adrian Chen spoke with a Russian man named Platon Mamatov who operated a troll farm of 20-
40 employees in the Ural Mountains. Between 2008 and 2013, Mamatov directed his troll farm 
of “mostly students and young mothers to carry out online tasks for Kremlin contacts and local 
and regional authorities from Putin’s United Russia party.”73 Mamatov described a complex 
maze of shell companies and other financial trickery that separated the trolls from their 
financiers, the Russian government authorities. This protected the Russian government, making 
it difficult to trace transactions to the source to build a case against the government. It also 
obfuscated the scale of the hacking and trolling operation. Insiders like Mamatov, however, put 
the number at “thousands - I’m not sure about how many, but yes, really, thousands.”74 
Russia’s covert cyberattacks included stealing or stealthily obtaining the private 
information of US citizens and releasing this data publicly. This represents a modern update of 
the Russian tradition of “kompromat,” or compromising material dispersed for the purposes of 
blackmail, extortion, or generating negative publicity about a person.75 Though this technique 
usually only concerns public figures, advances in social-news media allow for a much more 
expansive scope. In 2016, Russia obtained and spread the private information of US citizens for 
the purposes of gaining power through amassing data, blackmail, humiliation, and creating 
insecurity in Americans about their country’s protections. Russians obtained information through 
hacking voter rolls, setting up confessional hotlines promoted on Facebook, and hacking efforts 
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via the avatar of “Guccifer 2.0” and the website DCLeaks.com. Russian operatives then 
disseminated this information in exclusives to media outlets or to the website Wikileaks.76  
Russia recruited American citizens as assets, encouraging them through blackmail, 
bribes, or friendship to execute parts of the Russian agenda on domestic soil. One way Russia 
used social media to recruit American assets was through confessional hotlines advertised on 
Facebook and Instagram. Cybersecurity research firm New Knowledge compiled exhaustive 
research for a report on the IRA to go to the Senate Intelligence Committee. According to the 
New Knowledge report, the IRA placed significant emphasis on developing American assets, 
attempting to recruit mostly members of the Black community to complete IRA tasks, but also 
targeting members of the Political Left and Right.77  
The report outlined 16 kinds of tasks that the IRA sought Americans to perform, which 
included the Russian IRA members disguised as fellow Americans asking real Americans to help 
arrange meetings with preachers from Black churches,  solicit speakers for protests, or recruit 
volunteers to work pro-bono on immigration cases. Other tasks roped in Americans by offering 
free services like self-defense classes or counseling for sex addicts. The IRA used Facebook to 
ask for volunteers to distribute or design fliers, or to teach the self-defense classes. The IRA 
sometimes went for lewd or attention-grabbing requests, like asking female followers of an IRA 
account to send in photos of themselves for a calendar or asking for uploads as part of a 
YouTube contest dubbed “Pee on Hillary.”78 
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In one Russian recruitment case, the IRA promoted its confessional hotlines on the fake 
pro-LGBT Facebook page “LGBT United,” and the fake Christian page “Army of Jesus.”79 As 
shown in Exhibit 2, the IRA included three of the memes used in this strategy. The IRA posted 
one meme three times on its fake “Army of Jesus” Facebook page, and three times on its 
Instagram, with the words, “‘STRUGGLING WITH THE ADDICTION TO 
MASTURBATION? REACH OUT TO ME AND WE WILL BEAT IT TOGETHER.’ - JESUS” 
as well as “YOU CAN’T HOLD HANDS WITH GOD WHEN YOU ARE MASTURBATING. 
USE OUR HOTLINE IF YOU NEED HELP.” This meme received 5,436 likes, and 284 
comments. Similarly, the IRA posted to “LGBT United” a meme with the inscription, “If any 
gay/lesbian/transgender teenagers need anyone to talk to I’m here and I’ll listen. I’m not looking 
for a hook up or anything. I won’t even give out my gender or name. Times are hard and no one 
deserves to feel alone.” As pointed out in the IRA report, the practice of taking advantage of a 
person’s deepest secrets and most closely guarded vulnerabilities, particularly ones that could 
result in shame or disruption in one’s personal or financial situation if discovered, has been a 
time-honored strategy in Russia and the former USSR.  
Also, the idea of “infiltrating” protests and social movements has roots in Russia from the 
Soviet era. The IRA accomplished these ends in part through their confessional hotlines. The 
purpose of this tactic was to endear people to a social group that they deeply identified with, like 
people with similar beliefs about God, or young adults also coming to grip with their sexualities. 
In this space where Americans felt safe to interact with people who shared their core values, 
Russians encouraged them to attend political rallies, or to document protests to share their efforts 
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with the world. Often, the real Americans and fake Americans built a rapport over online or 
phone conversations.  
As was the case with the masturbation addiction hotline, however, sometimes the IRA 
members used blackmail and coercion rather than encouragement and friendship. After 
Americans called onto the hotlines to confess their shame about their addiction to masturbation 
or their internal struggle with their sexuality, the IRA members sometimes used this information 
to force Americans to complete IRA tasks for political mobilization, with the threat that if they 
did not complete the tasks, their “kompromat” would become public. Even without a direct threat 
from the “Army of Jesus” or “LGBT United” hotline workers that they might release this 
information if the callers did not do what was asked of them, once the callers divulged their 
secrets to the hotline workers, there was an implicit imbalance of power weighted towards the 
Facebook group. As Russians know through their historical use of kompromat, once a group 
gains intelligence of compromising material on an individual, the individual will automatically 
strive to keep themselves in the group’s good graces, to decrease the chances that the kompromat 
is used against them. 
In another instance, the IRA contacted Trump supporter Harry Miller through the fake 
Facebook page “Being Patriotic.” The Russians posting pro-Trump propaganda on “Being 
Patriotic” offered Miller $500- $1,000 to construct a cage on the bed of his pickup truck, which 
would then drive around a pro-Trump flash mob, showing imprisoned Hillary and Bill Clinton 
impersonators.80 Later, the Russians offered to send Miller and the Hillary impersonator on a 
paid trip to New York with the cage, which the Hillary impersonator accepted. Though the IRA 
employees spoke with Russian accents on the phone with Miller, he did not know he had been 
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compromised and turned into a Russian asset until the FBI visited him at his home several 
months later.  
Countless other American citizens furthered Russia’s agenda, participating in Black 
Lives Matter and All Lives Matter rallies next to each other on the same day, which Russian 
trolls organized and promoted to maximize political upheaval.81 Critically, even compromised 
Americans struggled to fathom that Russians played a role in their political actions. However, the 
Russian strategy was “not faking rallies or supporters, but trying to prompt real Americans who 
already backed a cause to turn out in support of it.”82 The purpose of Russian operations was to 
manufacture the semblance of furious, fractious Americans. Russians utilized the online and real 
identities of American people in an act of ventriloquism: the American’s image speaking the 
Kremlin’s voice. 
The IRA and other troll farms constituted just one facet of the Russian cyberoperations, 
with a vast network of IT-savvy individuals working on Russia’s behalf outside of government-
funded troll farms. The Russian interference operation was aggressive, brash, and successful; 
however, some contend that it is easy to overstate the sophistication of the attacks and its 
masterminds. In Russia’s hacks of the DNC, industry infrastructure, and state election servers, 
the hackers used basic tactics like spear-phishing. Many of the social media posts contained 
grammatical errors and demonstrated other signals that their authors were not American-born.  
Similarly, though Russia demonstrated the might of its arsenal of a network of hackers 
and trolls, Russia does not appear to have a military branch filled with genius hackers devoted to 
the Kremlin, or even a thriving technology industry from which the government could draw 
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talent. It appears many of the Kremlin’s cyber operations involved a smattering of hackers across 
Russia and former Soviet-bloc states. This explains why the FBI’s report on industry 
infrastructure hacking used the term “Russia-affiliated cyber actors”83 instead of Russian 
hackers- because many of the “cyber actors” were lone-wolves separate from the Russian 
military. Many of these actors committed the cyberattacks from Ukraine or other countries with 
high ethnically-Russian populations. Some were professional hackers, paid by members of the 
Russian intelligence services or military to do the hacking for them.  
According to the Atlantic’s article What Putin Really Wants, “in some cases [the hackers 
are] mercenary freelancers willing to work for the highest bidder- or cybercriminals who have 
been caught and blackmailed into working for the government.”84 Some cyber-actors were part 
of online communities that may or may not have had pro-Kremlin ideologies, but were either 
galvanized to troll for the sake of trolling, or because of the frenzy from other trolls, or because 
they actually identified with pro-Kremlin ideology and sought to perpetuate those opinions 
online. Some hacks, like that into the DNC, were carried out by government actors.  
The hacker groups famous for breaking into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
to steal and release information to damage the Democratic party worked under the aliases Fancy 
Bear, representing the Russian military intelligence online operations, and Cozy Bear, 
representing the Russian intelligence agency known as the FSB. However, according to Dmitri 
Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm hired to investigate this breach, 
one arm of this hacking operation did not know what the other was doing.85 Alperovitch stated 
that in his team’s investigation, they watched Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear simultaneously break in 
                                               
83 “Russian Government Cyber Activity” 
84 Ioffe, Julia. “What Putin Really Wants” The Atlantic. January/February 2018 Issue.  
85 Ioffe, Julia. “What Putin Really Wants.” 
35 
 
to the same online system and then simultaneously steal the same information from that system. 
This not only showed an inefficient use of resources, but also a blunder that increased risk of the 
operation as a whole, as the simultaneous operations threatened to compromise each other as 
they unfolded. This belied a lack of communication and coordination between government 
agencies and showed the somewhat haphazard and spontaneous nature in some of Russia’s 
cyberoperations.  
 Russia incorporated into the influence campaign an overt communications strategy, 
involving Russia’s state-run media agencies like Russia Today (RT), intermediaries between 
Russian interests and other media, and the use of “troll farms” to spread messages in Russia’s 
interests on social media. The DNI report notes Russia’s legacy of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) propaganda machine in the 20th century.86 Following the unexpected success 
for Russia of its involvement in the 2016 US election, the DNI anticipates Russian involvement 
in even more international election processes, disseminating information to sway the electorate 
or help elect a candidate more attractive to Moscow. 
 
The Timeline 
 
In a 2017 testimony for a hearing by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
FBI Special Agent Clint Watts characterized Russia as having “used social media driven 
information campaigns to discredit the U.S. for years. Facebook and Twitter remain littered with 
pro-Russian, Western looking accounts and supporting automated bots designed to undermine 
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the credibility of the U.S. government.”87 The IRA entered onto social media sites like Twitter to 
communicate domestically in 2009, but did not appear to broaden its influence to American 
social media users on Twitter until 2013.88 Watts began to notice influence operations in January 
of 2014, with pro-Russian accounts and bots trolling forums associated with Syria, its president 
Bashar Assad, terrorist group al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. By mid-2014, Watts characterized 
the Russian hacking and trolling campaign as “deliberate, well organized, well resourced, well-
funded, wide ranging.”89  
Watts later asserted that the Russian effort to interfere in the US originated in 2013, on 
the heels of Putin’s perceived humiliation at the hands of Hillary Clinton. Its nascent computer 
network demonstrated growing potential for power and influence, and the IRA trolls researched 
online personas and observed American social media users. In 2014, the Russian interference 
operation underwent capability development. In 2015, the operation focused on Russian users 
and accounts gaining the interest and loyalty of American users, seeking to ultimately win their 
audience. In 2016, the operation switched focus onto the US presidential election, seeking to use 
the operation’s fully honed capacity for hacking, disseminating propaganda posed as Americans, 
and swaying the political conversation. 
 
The Russian Media Network 
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 The Kremlin reached its domestic audience and an international audience with its 
propaganda for US politics through its extensive state-run platforms for propaganda. This 
allowed the Russian narrative of US politics to gain a large, global audience, and increased the 
likelihood of this narrative turning into actualized events in reality. Russia disseminated its 
message for its domestic audience through its Kremlin-controlled media outlets. Russia spread 
its message internationally in part through media outlets like RT (previously named Russia 
Today) and Sputnik. Troll armies reinforced the Russian narrative in Russia, the US, and to the 
larger global audience. 
         RT consistently broadcast English-language coverage critical of Clinton. According to 
the DNI report, the coverage criticized Clinton by focusing on the email scandal, corruption 
allegations, reports of her failing mental and physical health, and conspiracy theories. The report 
claims that in August of 2017, political analysts with connections to Putin’s political orbit 
brought up the idea of “avenging negative Western reports on Putin by airing segments devoted 
to Secretary Clinton’s alleged health problems.”90  
         RT’s video on Clinton with the most views, titled “How 100% of the Clintons’ ‘Charity’ 
Went To…Themselves,” received almost 10 million views across different social media sites. 
The Kremlin aimed to boost the viewership and conversation surrounding the RT’s videos, keep 
their subject matter in public discourse longer, and disseminate their ideas across the comment 
sections of main-stream news sites. The DNI report also alleges that US intelligence services 
could easily identify some of the social media accounts that shared these videos, as their 
accounts were previously devoted to propaganda promoting Russian involvements Ukraine.91 
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This denotes the perceived success of troll farms and Russian communications strategies in 
previous election interferences. 
 
Grappling with New Media 
 
Today’s advertising industry has the ability to disseminate geographically pervasive and 
emotionally affecting campaigns for goods or information. Where a handful of people in the past 
could spread their voice to a large number of people as news broadcasters or public people, with 
today’s social media technology, nearly every person on earth has the opportunity to use their 
voice in a way that reaches an unlimited audience. The technologies of the 21st century have 
granted access to opportunities to vast swaths of people, seeming to enact the virtues of freedom 
of speech and freedom of organization to an unprecedented extent. In the words of Heather 
Conley, author of ‘Kremlin Playbook’ from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
“while we were focusing on the positive of social media and information technology, Russia was 
looking at how to use that as an instrument, and they have been incredibly effective.”92 Social 
media and information technology would pose a threat to the stability of a nation’s institutions in 
and of themselves.  
Their business model derives revenue growth from producing fear or outrage-inducing 
coverage in return for the sponsorship of whichever company bids the highest. Increasingly, 
social-news media blurs the line to the point where the compelling interest behind a media output 
is indiscernible. Products and information pushed forth on behalf of sincerity and truth receive 
the same treatment as speech made on behalf of paid-content. In the social-news media, this 
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grants advertisers who want to promote their product and benefactors who want to promote their 
ideology unprecedented access to consumers. Producers now have the ability to market their 
goods and information to audiences that require their products and invest in social-news to 
change the perceived realities of the audiences that don’t yet require their products.  
Traditional advertising hinges on producers creating a need in consumers based on 
changing the way the customer perceives the output (like creating a need in a child for a Coca-
Cola because the child believes a Coke is an enjoyable product). This approach utilizes pull-side 
factors to attract customers. The new wave of social-news media hinges on producers creating a 
need in consumers based on changing the way the consumer perceives their entire reality, thus 
pushing the consumer towards the producers’ goods or information. For example, utilizing a 
push-side factor, a gun-manufacturing company might pay a news media outlet to underline 
coverage of home intrusions or develop a twitter account that amasses attention towards heroic 
acts performed by people with guns, to foster an overall environment conducive to their 
company’s potential for sales. 
This infrastructure connected a complex web of social media, news media, consumers, 
companies, independent interest groups, and governments. Russia quickly understood the 
opportunity to weaponize this technology. Speaking in a televised address to over a million 
Russian schoolchildren in 2017, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated, “Artificial Intelligence 
is the future, not only of Russia, but of all mankind. There are huge opportunities, but also 
threats that are difficult to foresee today. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become 
the ruler of the world.”93 In the social-news media industry, profit comes from ads in accordance 
with the amount of attention a media service receives. The more galling the media’s output, the 
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more attention it receives, leading to an increase in the extremity of media output. Social-news 
media’s profit motive alone leads to fear-based coverage and increased polarization.  
Increasingly, for a social-news media service to survive financially, it must generate news 
24 hours a day and 7 days a week democratization and now one of the primary functions of the 
nascent social-news media hybrid is to push centrists further towards the extremes, and to make 
the extremes more extreme. There are entire industries whose revenue stream revolves solely 
around using all available data to learn about people, categorize them by their interests and 
personalities, and then push the group to receive select information and ultimately affiliate with 
whoever is paying.  
 
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica 
 
In a presentation by CEO Alexander Nix of the infamous data harvesting company, 
Cambridge Analytica, Nix describes Cambridge Analytica’s process through the 2016 election, 
harvesting the data of “hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Americans to form a model to 
predict the personality of every single adult in the United States,”94 and then creating a nuanced 
message to target their personality. This process of behavioral microtargeting for election 
processes blends the techniques of audience targeting, data modeling, and psychographic 
profiling.  
In practice, Cambridge Analytica might seek to reference the Second Amendment before 
a US primary election on the feed of a user whose online history leads Cambridge Analytica to 
categorize as highly neurotic and conscientious. With such a person, Nix advised,  
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“you’re gonna need a message that is rational, and fear based...in this case, the threat 
of a burglary, and the insurance policy of a gun is very persuasive. Conversely, for a 
closed and agreeable audience, these are gonna be people who care about tradition, 
and habits, and family, and community, this could be the grandfather who taught his 
son to shoot, who will in turn teach his son, obviously talking about these values is 
gonna be much more important.”95  
Nix extolled the breadth of “big data,” which encompasses information on a person’s 
ethnicity down to their favorite brand of breakfast cereal.  
Nix demonstrated how Cambridge Analytica utilized big data for the Ted Cruz 2016 
presidential campaign in the Iowa Caucus. Cambridge Analytica created a cross section of 
partisanship by mobilization. It identified so-called ‘persuasion’ groups, in which the audience 
was extremely likely to vote, but was not very partisan, and in the words of Cambridge 
Analytica, “needed persuading.”96 In the instance of their work on behalf of the Ted Cruz 
campaign, Cambridge Analytica targeted a specific subgroup of low-partisanship, high-mobility, 
Iowan voters with low neuroticism and openness, and slight conscientiousness. To appeal to this 
group, Cambridge Analytica encouraged Cruz to targeting an issue particularly compelling to 
this group- gun rights. In the end, the Cruz campaign focused on persuading a select subgroup of 
45,000 people with a crafted gun rights message with a persuasion nuance catered to the 
personality profile of this subgroup, potentially focusing on certain Iowa counties, or even 
neighborhoods, or even as specifically as individual people.  
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50 years ago, a politician like Ted Cruz campaigning in a state like Iowa might only 
know the voting record of that state, a few recent poll results, and the information disseminated 
by their campaign staff. He would have to create a broad message that catered to the millions of 
people in Iowa, because he would have no way of knowing which voters would actually show up 
to the polls, and which issues he could focus on to rouse ambivalent voters in his direction. Now, 
instead of speaking to a broad base about a broad array of topics using a wide variety of rhetoric 
and techniques, a political campaign could target a few thousand key voters in each state on a 
few specific messages using a few targeted approaches (like using fear-based strategies or 
tradition-based rhetoric).  
Nix asserted that blanket advertising “is dead,” and that never again will the hundreds of 
millions of people in a target audience see the same billboard or receive the same pamphlet. He 
asserted that that the following generations will never understand “mass communication,” or 
blanket advertising. Instead, the new concept of targeted advertising would have a higher 
likelihood of achieving results at a higher return on investment at a lower overall expense. Nix 
credits Cambridge Analytica’s specialized algorithm for determining voter preferences as 
increasing Ted Cruz from polling at 5% to polling at 35% support, making him the second most 
formidable opponent in the race. Nix ends his presentation saying that of the two candidates left 
in the election (at that point, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump) only one was utilizing this 
technology. He concluded, “and it’s gonna be very interesting to see how they impact the next 
seven weeks.”97 
Cambridge Analytica provides an example of the tools the internet provides to allow 
unprecedented influence over its users. Its technology poses a threat to a nation’s unity in and of 
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itself, regardless of which interests utilize it. Behavioral microtargeting for election processes 
favors pandering and manipulating over producing the truth. It toys with the sanity of an entire 
nation, shepherding otherwise centrist voters to fall down an extremist rabbit hole, suggesting 
social-news media that best capitalizes on their unique weaknesses and biases. It also toys with 
the cohesiveness of a nation, in which neighbor can agree with neighbor on the most basic facts 
about the world around them. Cambridge Analytica and similar companies’ technology facilitate 
polarization.  Russia quickly understood the dark side of the proliferation of this technology to 
foment divisiveness.  
 This risk continues even without foreign interference intent upon defiling public trust and 
national power. However, in the case of the 2016 Presidential Election, foreign adversaries did 
interfere, sowing dissent and disillusionment, using the data to national detriment. Cambridge 
Analytica’s parent company, SCL, showed in promotional documents its election division having 
a station to work with Russian clients.98 SCL cofounder Christopher Wylie described Lukoil’s 
dogged interest in using data for political targeting in America, but its perturbing lack of interest 
in any commercial application of that data.99 According to journalist and Vanity Fair 
contributing editor Craig Unger, “SCL is in turn owned by shell companies that you can trace 
back to [Ukranian oligarch] Dmitry Firtash who is again tied to Mogilevich. That would 
complete the entire string and show crime boss and Mogilevich involved starting out pure and 
simple money laundering in 1984 with Trump properties going forward more than 32 years to 
the election in which this data mining firm Cambridge Analytica is playing a very, very big role 
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in the Trump campaign and helping him win.”100 Cutting-edge social-news media technology 
connected the Trump campaign with the Kremlin, as well as with a crucial sector of US voters. 
 
On the Larger Role of Social Media 
 
The internet and social media created profound gaps in national barriers, posing as key 
entry points for Russian influence in national processes like elections. Putin understood the 
advent of AI as the next frontier in intervention, and created programs to broaden Russian 
students’ understanding of AI. The United States faces a reckoning with many of the products of 
its own invention. The United States displays confusion with regard to a national response to the 
digital era, and faces a reckoning with many of the products of its own invention.  
Within a span of less than a decade, social media networks like Facebook and Twitter 
have gained market share and control of interpersonal, local, national, and global discourse. 
Facebook currently boasts over 2.7 billion users, or about one in three people on Earth. Facebook 
is an empire, even if it describes itself as a digital dorm-hallway whiteboard, facilitating friendly 
chats between friends and family. Facebook consistently buys out its competitors, either adding 
them to its business model (like Instagram, purchased in 2008) or splitting them up and selling 
them for parts.101 It dominates the market of public opinion, allowing no similarly powerful 
competitors that provide a congruent service. As such, its monopolizing the market makes 
Facebook indispensable and indestructible, at least for the time.  
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US national conversation often turns to social media: how should social media handle 
trolls, what images and ideas should be censored, how prevalent can social media be in our lives 
while keeping us healthy? Solutions to these problems are often difficult to solidify and divided 
in their support. Social media companies often shield their internal processes from public view, 
making direct policy amendment proposals difficult to create, communicate, and follow up with. 
Often, public scrutiny must rise to the level of a national outrage, like the Cambridge Analytica 
Scandal, for social media companies to make statements and appearances to defend their actions 
and propose changes.  
That being said, few changes in the fundamental nature of social media occurred over the 
last decade. Despite the scandal of Facebook allowing nearly ¾ of the news on its website to be 
misleading or blatantly untrue, Facebook consequently provided little insight into how it will 
distinguish fake and real accounts, and how it will punish infractions. Few have access to the 
factors that drive Facebook’s algorithm, which in turn determines the news feeds of over 1 
billion Facebook users. During the lead-up to the election, Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl 
Sandberg, CEO and CFO of Facebook, respectively, both released taped press statements in 
which they assured their users, shareholders, and nation that foreign powers had no undue 
influence within their platform.102 This was a deliberate mistruth, which was proven in 
documents subpoenaed by a 2016 Congressional hearing to be a direct contradiction of 
preexisting information regarding Russian influence beginning as early as 2014. Thus, Facebook 
knowingly conducted a cover-up of damaging company information to the detriment of the 
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United States and the benefit of the Russian operation, thus showing their complicity in the 
operation as a whole. Facebook and other social media companies handled Russia’s interference 
in US politics poorly, often facilitating or promoting its platforms. 
The United States federal and state governments were created in part to sever Americans 
from the unwanted foreign influence of Great Britain. Some of the first laws created were anti-
sedition laws, designed to fortify the country from intellectual threats as well as physical ones. 
Responsibilities like protecting and promoting national interests, balancing the liberty and 
equality of citizens, and establishing and executing a formal policy to handle foreign enemies 
and allies are too expansive for corporations to handle. Like the integration of the government 
into the aviation industry post-9/11, social media companies might require a similar level of 
integration of government into their process, from top to bottom. 
 
Hacking and Timed Releases of Damning Information 
Using What Did Exist- Emails 
 
The influence campaign bifurcates into two strategies: covert efforts and overt efforts. 
Covert efforts include the use of technological warfare, like hacking and leaking private 
government information. Russia’s military intelligence units hacked into the private servers of 
Democrats and Republicans in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election. The DNI report 
assesses the identity of Guccifer 2.0 and the portal of DCLeaks.com as covert Russian military 
intelligence unit (known as General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, GRU) activity.103 
Sometimes, the GRU would relay the private information they obtained onto WikiLeaks. This 
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site famously released private emails hacked from the DNC server in 2016. Additionally, the 
GRU infiltrated the system of several US state and local electoral boards.  
The hacker group under the name Fancy Bear infiltrated the email of Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign chairman, John Podesta, using a spear-fishing strategy. These hackers sent emails to 
the target masked as Microsoft, notifying the target that their email password expired and 
required changing. The email included a link that redirected the target to a fake page for them to 
change their password. Once the hackers gained access, they established themselves as the local 
administrator, enabling them to install malware on the networks. Fancy Bear used this technique 
to hack government officials in both parties in the build-up to the 2016 US presidential election, 
and Russian hackers also used this technique in hacking the staffers of US Senators vulnerable in 
the 2018 US midterm elections, and with hacking critical industry IT networks in 2016-2018.104 
Russian intelligence operatives expanded their operation beyond political parties of both 
major US political parties, notably hacking into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 
Republican National Committee (RNC). They also hacked into other influential organizations to 
the election process, like think tanks and lobbying groups. An intelligence committee analysis 
(ICA) released by the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that Russian hackers infiltrated 
organizations and networks based on their likelihood of shaping US policies or US electoral 
results.105 
 
Using What Did Not Exist- The Loretta Lynch Scandal 
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 The FBI has long maintained a precedent of remaining quiet on political matters falling 
under its jurisdiction in the final months of a presidential campaign cycle. So-called “October 
surprises,” where political scandals unravel in the months before a presidential election, are 
noted for their outsized effect on voters. For example, in the 2000 presidential election, polls had 
candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore neck-in-neck, until news broke in October that Bush 
was arrested in 1976 for driving while intoxicated.106 Bush strategist Karl Rove later asserted 
that, in his opinion, this October surprise cost Bush victory in five states in the election. Though 
it is impossible to know just what role a political scandal assumes and what blowback results 
from it, political campaigns dread a revelation coming out in October, as their candidate has very 
little time for rebuttal or image management, and the incident stays fresh on the minds of voters 
when they get to the polls. Due to the documented phenomenon of October surprises assuming 
an unavoidable political response, FBI policy dictates that FBI officials and investigators hold 
off making announcements or comments until after an election, so as to avoid the appearance of 
the FBI influencing political outcomes.  
On July 5, 2016, FBI director James Comey broke that precedent.107 Without notifying 
his boss, Attorney General Loretta Lynch, Comey held a press conference roundly perceived as 
issuing a “scathing critique” of Secretary Clinton. Department of Justice practice and protocol 
dictated that the Bureau not comment on an investigation or its evidence if no charges were 
leveled, so as to not air out the dirty laundry of a subject that is, in fact, clear of wrongdoing. 
Protocol also dictated the Bureau not comment on political matters in an election year. 
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Department protocol also dictates that public statements by the FBI Director occur under the 
authority of the FBI Director’s boss, the US Attorney General. Lastly, Department protocol 
directed the FBI to adequately and completely convey the legal standpoint reached by the 
Department of Justice’s prosecutors.  
Comey’s stunning decision to break these precedents led to a Department of Justice 
Inspector General investigation and 568-page report analyzing the FBI’s decision-making 
process in the 2016 election year. Comey stated to the Department that five factors led him to 
believe these extraordinary steps were warranted, and that he could not involve his boss, AG 
Lynch, in the announcement that the FBI’s “Midyear” investigation into Clinton’s emails would 
not charge Clinton with an offense. Comey stated that he believed he could not have any 
involvement with Lynch because that would cause “corrosive doubt” about the validity of the 
entire FBI investigation.108  
First, Comey believed Lynch would be seen as corrupting the FBI’s investigation because 
a Democrat, then President Obama, had appointed Lynch. Second, Comey pointed to Lynch’s 
alleged decision to call the Midyear investigation a “matter,” as well as a spontaneous 15-30 
minute meeting between Lynch and Bill Clinton on a tarmac on June 27, 2016. However, none 
of these factors warrant, or really explain, the unprecedented decision by an FBI director to issue 
a unilateral, FBI-only statement to the public about a closed investigation, and the director 
purposefully spending months planning this statement while keeping his superiors in the dark. In 
fact, the Republican Inspector General’s report called Comey’s choices “extraordinary and 
insubordinate for Comey to do so, and we found none of his reasons to be a persuasive basis for 
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deviating from well-established Department policies in a way intentionally designed to avoid 
supervision by Department leadership over his actions.”109 
However, Comey outlined a fifth, crucial rationale for his massively consequential 
decision. Comey told investigators that he chose to completely cut out the authority figures at the 
Department of Justice from his choice to go straight to the media, with the Department learning 
of Comey’s imminent press conference on July 5 from a media inquiry that morning, due to 
“concerns that certain classified information mentioning Lynch would leak.”110 When describing 
his thought process leading up to the July 5 press conference, “Comey said that he also was 
concerned about an issue specific to Lynch...Comey told the OIG that the FBI had obtained 
highly classified information in March 2016 that included allegations of partisan bias or attempts 
to impede the Midyear investigation by Lynch.” Multiple witnesses, including Comey, told the 
OIG that the FBI quickly understood that the intelligence was “not credible.”111  
The Washington Post claims that the classified information was a Russian intelligence 
document intercepted by the FBI in March of 2016.112 This document spoke of an email between 
the Clinton Campaign and the Justice Department. The document did not include the email itself, 
just communication about the contents of the purported email. Allegedly, the Chairwoman of the 
Democratic National Committee, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz (DWS), emailed 
Leonard Benardo, a staffer at George Soros’s pro-democracy charity called the Open Society 
Foundation. DWS allegedly told Benardo in the email that Loretta Lynch was keeping private 
communications with the Clinton Campaign, with Lynch stealthily reassuring Clinton staffer 
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Amanda Renteria that Lynch would not allow the FBI’s investigation into Clinton’s emails to go 
too far.113  
The allegations strained credulity, and came from a source with a history of 
unsubstantiated claims. According to the OIG report, after four months of investigating, the FBI 
still could not find any information to corroborate the claims from the intercepted document. 
Comey asserted he instantly knew the document was not credible, because the Russian 
intelligence document also suggested that Comey himself was interfering in the Midyear 
investigation by trying to drag out the investigation for the Republicans’ political benefit, which 
was untrue.  
According to the Post, Lynch told the FBI she did not know and had never communicated 
with Renteria. Renteria told the Post that FBI investigators never even contacted her about the 
issue, and that she did not know and had never communicated with Attorney General Lynch. 
DWS said she did not know of, and had never heard of, Leonard Benardo. Benardo said he had 
only ever read about DWS, but had never communicated with her. The FBI dismissed the 
information and only discussed the issue with Lynch as a “defensive briefing,” or an opportunity 
for her to learn ahead of time of a potentially problematic piece of intelligence in the works. The 
FBI did not contact Lynch, Benardo, Renteria, or DWS to conduct interviews with them about 
the allegations in the Russian intelligence document. Upon learning about the Russian document 
and her alleged role from a Post reporter, Renteria said “wow, that’s kind of weird and out of left 
field.” According to the Post, the alleged conspirators felt bewildered that they had been 
implicated in this confusing web connecting the Attorney General Loretta Lynch to the Clinton 
campaign through staffer Amanda Renteria who then spoke to DNC chair, DWS, about Lynch’s 
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reassurances; with DWS reaching out to NGO employee Leonard Benardo with ties to George 
Soros.114  
In the US, these connections may seem haphazard. However, according to a statement in 
the Post’s article from Russia expert and director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center, 
Matt Rojansky, “the idea that Russians would tell a story in which the Clinton campaign, Soros 
and even an Obama administration official are connected- that Russians might tell such a story, 
that is not at all surprising. Because that is part of the Kremlin worldview.”115 In 2015, Russia 
banned the Open Society Foundation, which was founded by Hungarian-born Wall Street hedge 
fund manager George Soros as a charity for promoting democracy internationally. The 
organization Benardo worked for, the Open Society Foundation, and the head of the campaign 
Renteria worked for, Hillary Clinton, “are both regarded as political enemies of the Kremlin.”116 
Summarily, the intelligence proved unconvincing and unsubstantiated. Nonetheless, it played a 
critical role in the Director of the FBI breaking Department protocol, going over the heads of his 
superiors to do damage-control for a Russian intelligence document before it ever leaked. 
The importance of this document was not that the FBI necessarily believed it was true. 
The importance was that the FBI understood the information was not credible, but, according to 
the Department of Justice report, “Comey said that he became concerned that the information 
about Lynch would taint the public’s perception of the Midyear investigation if it leaked, 
particularly after DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 began releasing hacked emails in mid-June 
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2016.”117 Essentially, Russia concocted a document that disparaged one of the highest US 
officials, the US attorney general, in a somewhat transparent and unsophisticated way.  
Comey likely thought the document had some degree of fiction to it, but was more fearful 
of the document being released like other emails in the waves of hacked information being 
dumped by Wikileaks and unknown actors like DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0. Comey anticipated 
that if online hackers leaked this document, the thoroughness and impartiality of the FBI’s 
Midyear investigation would be called into question. Hypothetically, people could have then 
pointed at the FBI and said that it kept crucial intelligence about government officials and a 
presidential candidate from the voting public, thus influencing the vote, which the vast majority 
anticipated would go in Clinton’s favor anyway. People could have said that Lynch interfered in 
the investigation all along, and the only reason the FBI reached the conclusion it did when it did 
was due to Lynch’s obstruction. Comey preemptively addressed this public uproar, holding a 
televised press conference in which he delivered an unprecedentedly strident critique of Clinton. 
He showed just how little the FBI was influenced by Lynch by unilaterally closing the 
investigation. Similarly, he showed just how little he was willing to protect Clinton by delivering 
a scathing address to the public in an election year. In Comey’s mind, he was protecting the FBI 
in doing so. 
In Comey’s maneuver to highlight how untainted he remained by his boss’s 
“manipulations,” he instead performed like a puppet whose strings were pulled by the Kremlin. 
The Kremlin fashioned together conversations describing rumors of an original email, and 
transmitted it through an intelligence officer who provided bad information to the US before. In 
response to this underwhelming operation, one of the most trusted authority figures in the US 
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broke bureaucratic protocol and acted in response to the potential threat of these rumors carried, 
elevating them to the level of reality and relevance.  
This document contributed to the FBI Director purposefully acting in a way he would not 
towards a non-political figure by being tougher-than-usual, and more public-than-usual, to 
showcase how little he is swayed by the political stature of the person under investigation. In an 
effort to not appear to the public as easy on Clinton, influenced by Lynch, and unconcerned 
about top-secret intel about communication between the AG’s office and the Clinton campaign, 
Comey was as tough on Clinton as he could be without requiring a charge. In a way, the FBI 
Director substantiated otherwise baseless claims by speaking and acting directly in relation to 
them.  
They were unfounded and unimportant, but out of fear of their ability to make the FBI 
seem biased in its decision making, Comey purposefully made a biased choice to not seem as 
biased when an extreme conspiracy would come out. This contributed to the chaos surrounding 
politics in 2016, and potentially delivered a death blow to the Clinton campaign due to events 
that would unfold three months later, in October. 
Again, FBI policy dictates that information about an investigation gets released when a 
person is charged by the FBI with a crime. If the FBI does not decide to charge a person with a 
crime, the public likely would never have known that the person was under investigation in the 
first place. There is no formal announcement of “opening” or “closing” an investigation with the 
FBI; either a person is charged and the public hears about it, or nothing at all. This is useful 
when the FBI encounters additional evidence, because it does not need to go through a procedure 
to announce to the public they are “reopening” a case. In the case of the FBI’s Midyear 
investigation in 2016, however, there was such an announcement.  
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The FBI’s usual useful precedent was not in place when the husband of Hillary Clinton’s 
top aide had his laptop subpoenaed by the FBI under child pornography charges, and previously 
undiscovered emails were encountered in this process. In an October surprise for the books, less 
than two weeks before the election, James Comey notified Congress that he was reopening the 
investigation into Clinton due to the discovery of “new evidence.” In the following week, critics 
lambasted Clinton and debated whether she would become the first sitting US President charged 
with a crime, and whether she could effectively do her job as president with this now ongoing 
investigation looming over her. This firestorm prompted yet another comment on an ongoing 
investigation from the FBI, with Comey telling the press two days before the election that though 
the FBI had not been able to completely review all the new evidence in question, the FBI would 
stand by its decision from July to not charge Clinton with a crime. Even with this comment, 
Clinton herself credits the FBI’s handling of the Midyear investigation in the months before the 
election as one of the major factors precipitating her shocking loss in the polls. 
This saga illustrates the indirect yet consequential role that Russian intervention played in 
American political life. First, Russian election interference influenced the narrative surrounding 
political figures and institutions in 2016, and was partly responsible for a political environment 
so caustic that the FBI director chose to break Department protocol to assuage critics in the 
public about an FBI investigation. Comey described a need to protect the FBI, judging that this 
political climate could pose an existential threat to the legitimacy of the FBI and its decisions. 
The Kremlin’s efforts helped turn agencies like the Department of Justice and the FBI against 
each other, thus minimizing their power and increasing the likelihood of agencies working in 
their self-interest, potentially at the cost of the nation’s interests.  
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The Kremlin’s influence campaign subtly and effectively manipulated this shift in the 
tone and tenor of American national conversation. Additionally, the Kremlin’s hacking strategy 
succeeded by disseminating damaging information about the Kremlin’s enemies and by 
encouraging the public to trust in the information they found online as the true story behind the 
lies spread by the government. The Kremlin weaponized this trust through the threat or 
intimidation that any intelligence could suddenly become public, so authorities felt pressure to 
respond to baseless foreign propaganda in a completely new way. Unfortunately, in Comey’s 
effort not to appear beholden to the Department of Justice and the Democrats in power, he 
perfectly executed elements of the Kremlin’s agenda.  
 
Recruiting the Trump Campaign 
 
Luke Harding served as Moscow Bureau Chief for The Guardian until the Russian 
government expelled him in 2011. According to Harding, Russia certainly opened a file on 
Trump in 1977, but might have started watching him even sooner. That being said, Czechoslovak 
spy records de-classified in 2016 indicate consistent contact between Czechoslovak spies and the 
father of Trump’s bride, Ivana, who he married in 1977. Such records from communist Eastern 
bloc countries transferred to the Moscow spy agency, the KGB. The next known contact, 
according to Harding, came as part of a deliberate, detailed effort to endear Trump to the Soviet 
government in the mid-1980’s.118  
In his novel, “The Art of the Deal,” Trump described his process of beginning 
negotiations on a potential real estate deal to build a Trump Tower in Moscow, “The idea got off 
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the ground after I sat next to the Soviet ambassador, Yuri Dubinin, at a luncheon held by 
Leonard Lauder. Dubinin’s daughter, it turned out, had read about Trump Tower and knew all 
about it. One thing led to another, and now I’m talking about building a large luxury hotel, across 
the street from the Kremlin, in partnership with the Soviet government. They have asked me to 
go to Moscow in July.”119  
According to Harding, despite Trump’s perception of the meeting as a happy accident, 
this meeting was actually the product of a “concerted effort by the Soviet Government.”120 
Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin visited Trump’s office in Trump Tower in an effort to entice 
him into projects beneficial to the Soviet Union. According to Dubinin’s daughter, who also 
acted as a player in the scheme to endear or recruit Trump, in the meeting Trump “melted.”121 
After a few months, as Trump again noted in “The Art of the Deal,” he received a personal 
invitation from the USSR to visit the country, and subsequently Trump took his first trip to 
Soviet Moscow with his then-wife Ivana.122  
In the following decades, the Kremlin undoubtedly kept its eye on Trump, and its 
oligarchs frequently invested in Trump properties. The effort to make ill-gotten money look 
legitimate, or money laundering, is a problem for the real estate industry. Illegitimate funds can 
be used to purchase an expensive New York apartment or a large mansion, taking the illegitimate 
funds from the buyer’s hands and offloading them on to the seller. Real estate is subject to 
relatively less regulation than other financial industries, so massive transactions involving all 
cash deals between potentially shady players for a price meaningfully higher than market value 
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receives less scrutiny than similar types of transactions on the US Stock Exchange, for example. 
Russia provided the Trump Company with ample capital over the decades, funneling in money 
through Trump properties to protect stolen funds from Russia’s volatile economy.  
A sales officer involved with the developing and marketing of Trump towers in Florida, 
Jose Lima, said of Russians investing their funds in Trump properties for money laundering 
purposes, “they were trying to save their butts, but in fact, they were saving ours.”123 During the 
peak of the US Great Recession, which was caused in part by a rupture of the US housing 
bubble, creating a hostile environment for real estate and home sales for years, the Trump 
Corporation stayed afloat. According to Lima, this was in large part due to Russian oligarchs 
attempting to wash their money, so much so that Lima estimated that of the 500 Trump Tower 
Florida units Lima sold, one-third were purchased by Russians. According to the Washington 
Post, locals call the area housing Trump Towers in Florida “Little Moscow.” This pattern also 
holds true for Trump properties in Hollywood, Florida and Panama City, Panama. When asked 
by a reporter how the Trump Company successfully made it through the financial crisis when 
nearly all the other comparable golf construction companies had to stop production, Eric Trump 
said, “well, we don’t rely on American banks. We have all the funding we need out of 
Russia.”124 Similarly, Donald Trump Jr. said in 2008, “Russians make up a pretty 
disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. We see a lot of money pouring in from 
Russia.”125  
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An outlandish example of Russian money laundering and potential opportunities in which 
Russia attempted to gain Trump as an asset was the sale of Trump’s tear-down Palm Beach 
mansion. In 2004, during the housing bubble with vastly inflated housing prices about to be met 
with nearly no demand among housing buyers, Donald Trump bought a Palm Beach mansion 
from a bankruptcy auction for $41 million.126 Trump shared with the local media his plans to 
renovate the mansion into a diamond in the rough. However, within three years, the housing 
crisis hit and Trump also went through personal financial troubles. Trump desperately needed 
capital, and even worse, it was discovered that the mansion was a “tear-down,” covered in mold 
and essentially worth less than the ground it sat on.  
In Trump’s moment of need, with stagnant housing sales across the nation and Trump’s 
personal default splashed across the news, a Russian oligarch Dmitry Rybolovlev bought the 
tear-down mansion for $95 million. At the time, this was the most expensive real estate deal in 
history, for a house that was condemned to demolition. Rybolovlev never stepped inside the 
mansion, which later was demolished and subdivided into parcels of land for sale.127 This bizarre 
deal epitomizes the willingness of the Trump Company to engage in shady real estate deals, and 
the deepening relationship between the Company and Russian oligarchy.  These ties between 
Russian oligarch customers and the Trump business enhances the sway Putin has over Trump, 
even indirectly, as Russian clients make up such a meaningful portion of Trump’s customer base. 
  Though the Kremlin and the Trump campaign did coordinate in 2016 and years prior, the 
Mueller investigation did not find coordination rising to the level of criminality. The Mueller 
report defined coordination as “an agreement-tacit or express- between the Trump Campaign and 
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the Russian government on election interference,”128 Trump interacted with the Russian 
government on election interference, for example, with the hacking of the Clinton campaign. On 
July 27, 2016, Trump said in a press conference, “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able 
to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our 
press. Let’s see if that happens. That’ll be next.”129 Reports show that Russian hackers began 
hacking the Hillary campaign and the DNC that night. Trump crafted a tacit agreement with 
Russia- if you hack Hillary to resurface her emails, you will get support in the press. Trump 
subsequently followed through, saying later that same day, “wouldn’t it be a great thing if we 
could get along with Russia.” In September of 2016, Trump said of Putin, “he’s been a leader, 
far more than our president has been a leader.”130 Trump endeared Russia in the media, as they 
endeavored to supply him with the stolen emails. However, according to the Mueller report, the 
coordination between Trump and Russia did not reach the level of criminal conspiracy.131  
 For many of us, the most dishonorable crime (without bloodshed) a person could commit 
as President is treason. The nightmare scenario is that somehow, a foreign asset works their way 
up through the political process, achieving the office of the Presidency while covertly working 
on behalf of a foreign government. An even worse scenario is if the foreign asset President 
works on behalf of an enemy. An even worse still, is a scenario in which that foreign asset 
President readily sacrifices the good of the US to further the interests of the enemy. Cataclysmic, 
if that foreign asset President then uses the power of the Presidency to defend himself from 
investigation.  
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 It bodes well for the country that a nonpartisan, esteemed investigative institution 
conducted a thorough investigation and consequently did not recommend to charge a sitting US 
president with conspiracy for coordinating and colluding. On the ten-tentacled Giant Squid that 
is the Russian interference campaign, coordination between Trump and Russia was one arm. The 
Mueller campaign did not find enough additional damning information to demand a 
recommendation of a coordination or conspiracy charge. America must focus on the meat of the 
issue: Russia’s cyberattacks on the United States, and how to stop them. 
 
ASSESSING MOTIVES 
The US Intelligence Assessment of the Influence Campaign 
 
 According to the DNI report, Russian involvement in the United States election process 
originated from “Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic 
order.”132 The Russian government sought to substantiate its own narrative within Russia and 
around the world, promulgating propaganda about “its desires and redlines, whether on Ukraine, 
Syria, or relations with the United States.”133 The report assessed Russia’s actions in the 2016 
US presidential election as, in part, a continuation of increasingly aggressive attacks lobbed 
against the United States and its regional adversaries. Nonetheless, the report asserted that these 
actions constitute a “significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort 
compared to previous operations.”  The purpose of this influence campaign was “to undermine 
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability 
                                               
132 “Assessing Russian Activities” 
133 Ibid.
62 
 
and potential presidency. We [intelligence officers of the NSA, CIA, and FBI] further assess 
Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.”134  
 
Driving Forces 
 
The Russian influence campaign acted out a wide array of motives, discussed in detail 
further in this paper. Briefly, Putin sought to settle scores, boost the image of Russia relative to 
the US, and undermine the global democratic order. Putin aimed to denigrate the campaign and 
character of then-candidate Hillary Clinton, and to harm the viability of her expected election 
victory, so that she would have less power once elected president. Putin also sought to assist the 
campaign for Donald Trump, so that a vehemently pro-Russia and anti-Clinton candidate would 
make it further in the race. Also, Russian interference promoted the campaigns of Bernie 
Sanders, another rival of Hillary Clinton, to build the opposition to her expected presidency.135 
The interference also worked to destabilize and dismantle democracy, minimizing domestic and 
foreign critics of Putin’s less liberal form of government. Similarly, interference confused the 
ideas of human rights and liberal democratic order in people’s minds, making them seem less 
defined and less feasible. By blurring the lines of values and ideals, interference also sought to 
replace America’s moral outrage with confusion and anxiety towards Russia fulfilling an 
Imperialist agenda of invading and annexing certain territories.  
The interference campaign aimed to sow chaos and confusion, making victims of the 
campaign more insecure and mistrustful of the capacity of the US government and its institutions 
to provide protection and effectively govern. It aimed to manufacture events in reality that would 
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both substantiate and exacerbate the disillusionment of US citizens towards the US government 
and its institutions. The interference displayed Russia’s brazenness when going toe-to-toe with 
the United States. Putin sees the Cold War as ongoing, just with different weapons this round. 
Putin sought to gain respect, fear, and victory for Russia in Cold War Part II.  
According to the DNI report, the interference generated publicity for events that casted 
Russia in a controlling, powerful light, shifting coverage away from the national embarrassments 
of the Sochi Olympics Doping Scandal, the Panama Papers elite tax fraud scandal, and more.136 
Additionally, the campaign served to generate general publicity for Russia, after often being 
dismissed or belittled as a global force during the Obama administration. The interference 
perpetuated Putin’s belief that democratic or not, all elections are “rigged,” all politicians can be 
paid off, and all talk of virtues and human rights are a facade, masking corruption and abuses 
that are universal to any political system. Potentially, Putin does not truly believe this, but rather 
wishes to spread this belief outwards for personal gain. Lastly, the interference avenges what 
Putin sees as NATO and the EU’s violations of promises they made before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989, leading to a Great Depression in Russia worse than the US’s Great 
Depression in the 1930’s.137  
These motives display Putin’s conspiratorial nature, portraying a leader that lashes out 
and casts blame elsewhere, including for the events that were more clearly the result of Putin’s 
personal fault, or just the confluence of bad timing and bad luck. They show a leader motivated 
by personal, financial gain and political prestige, rather than a set of guiding principles. They 
show a leader who capitalizes on the traumas in Russia’s collective memory, like its Great 
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Depression in the 1990’s, but continues to covertly exacerbate the problem through money 
laundering and luxurious kick-backs for his personal friends in the Russian oligarchy. Putin’s 
mounting aggressions constitute a threat to the international viability of democratic nations, and 
requires a serious, global response.  
 
Foundations of Geopolitics: One Strategy for Global Domination 
 
Like Putin, a man named Aleksander Dugin despaired at the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos that descended over his once great homeland. 
Dugin despised the role the US played in the USSR’s collapse, and the policies the US took part 
in crafting which left the former USSR’s economy devastated and irreparable, similar to the way 
the rest of Europe left Germany to flounder after World War I. According to The Foundations of 
Aleksandr Dugin’s Geopolitics: Montage Fascism and Eurasianism as Blowback, Russians hold 
a negative perception of the United States due to its role in supporting the USSR’s alcoholic 
president Boris Yeltsin, failing to grant Russia membership in NATO or economic help from 
NATO, and growing NATO until it encroached on Russia’s borders, which some Russians saw 
as American Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush going back on their word.138 Russia’s 
state-controlled media pedaled out this message targeting the US as a scapegoat for Russia’s 
problems, resulting in a generation of Russians like Dugin and Putin who have long held a 
dogma of anti-Westernism.   
Dugin plays a role in Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential election through 
his book, Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, published in 1997. 
                                               
138 Fellows, Grant Scott, "The Foundations of Aleksandr Dugin's Geopolitics: Montage Fascism and Eurasianism as 
Blowback" (2018). 
65 
 
According to a scholar of Russian fascism and its far-right movement: “There probably has not 
been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period that has exerted an 
influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of 
Aleksandr Dugin's 1997 neo-fascist treatise, Foundations of Geopolitics.”139 As of 2016, 
Foundations of Geopolitics continued to be required reading at military universities, including 
the General Staff Academy, and assigned as a textbook.140  
In part, Dugin’s book attempted to create a distinct, albeit fascist and nationalist, 
diplomatic strategy for Russia after the vacuum of international policy left by Yeltsen’s 
administration. Reports vary about the extent to which Dugin’s writings informed Putin as he 
worked his way up the KGB. Nonetheless, Dugin’s book, “published at a crucial time in Russian 
history and taught to many senior military leaders in the Russian Armed Forces at the General 
Staff Academy Dugin’s ideas—or perhaps more accurately—the montage of ideas he’s stitched 
together from disparate, authoritarian intellectual materials, have been influential, or at least 
superficially appropriated by the Kremlin and the Russian armed forces.”141  
With regard to Europe, Dugin advocated for the rise of “continental” European and Asian 
powers through alliances with Moscow, creating a Eurasia-Russia center of power. Dugin 
advocated for Moscow to rise again as the “third Rome,” gaining global dominance with Russia 
absorbing Finland, Romania, Macedonia, “Serbia Bosnia,” Greece, and most crucially, ending 
Ukraine’s independence. Dugin recommended establishing Germany as the dominant regional 
force through which Russia could exercise a “Moscow-Berlin axis.” France would partner with 
Germany to form a Franco-German bloc, thus putting power in the hands of continental Europe 
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and away from the “Atlantic” power of Britain. Estonia would transfer into Germany’s hands. 
Dugin advocated for dismantling the European Union and displacing the United Kingdom as a 
regional force by cutting its ties and isolating it from continental Europe.142  
Debatably, Germany currently stands as the dominant force in Europe, with the largest 
economy and a critical role in the EU. France is its next closest ally in the EU, forming a kind of 
“Franco-German bloc.” Russia interfered in France and Germany’s election systems in 2015, 
fanning far-right political movements in both, which would grow to challenge the pro-Western, 
anti-Kremlin establishment in France and Germany. In the 2015 British referendum over Britain 
leaving the European Union, Russia interfered in its election system with tactics that Russia 
would later replicate in the 2016 US Presidential election. Russia’s influence operation in 
Britain, like its influence operation in the US, succeeded, and Britain voted to leave the European 
Union, thus limiting its power in Europe and the European Union’s power as a bloc. Lastly, 
Russian forces occupied and annexed Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014, after successfully 
electing pro-Kremlin Ukranian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, though he was ousted by 
the 2014 Maidan Revolution. In the last two decades since “Foundations” was published, Russia 
at least partially succeeded or made progress in its objectives for Ukraine, Britain, France and 
Germany.  
With regard to the Middle East, Dugin promoted creating a “Moscow-Tehran axis,” with 
Iran as Russia’s main ally in the region, through which Russia could exercise influence through a 
“continental Russian-Islamic alliance.” Among other policy suggestions, Dugin stressed Russia 
end Georgia’s independence and absorb it. Dugin advocated for Russia to shake pro-Western 
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Turkey through “geopolitical shocks” inciting upsets between Armenians and Kurds. Dugin 
sought a divided Turkey and an ally in the region of Iran, goals which succeeded over time.143  
Most notable in the Middle East was Dugin’s aim for the division and reabsorption of 
Georgia. In 2008, tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated into the Russo-Georgian War, 
in which Georgia fought against Russia and Russian-backed but internationally-unrecognized 
separatist states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This brutal conflict involved information 
warfare, and was the first documented conflict where cyberattacks coincided with military 
warfare. Eleven years before Russia’s interference campaign in the US election system, it honed 
its communication strategies to reclaim the narrative over the Russo-Georgian War. With regard 
to Eastern and Southern Asia, Dugin advocated for China to expand its influence through south-
east Asian countries, like Vietnam and the Philippines, while Russia would expand east to secure 
a continental European-Asian empire. Russia’s interference in the US election allowed it to boost 
the anti-trade, anti-Trans-Pacific-Partnership platform, thus accomplishing more of Dugin’s 
suggested end.144 
Most notably, Dugin advised Russia to “introduce geopolitical disorder into internal 
American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, 
actively supporting all dissident movements - extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus 
destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to 
support isolationist tendencies in American politics.”145 Dugin suggested using Russia’s 
expertise in covert operations to conduct a campaign on American soil to incite turmoil and 
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divisiveness in the US. Dugin specifically suggested harnessing the vitriol of racists to ostracize 
African Americans.  
According to Oxford’s Computational Propaganda Research Project on The IRA, Social 
Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018, Russia’s IRA executed a piece 
of Dugin’s suggestions. The IRA sought to twist the knife of racial injustices experienced by 
African Americans, exploiting police shootings and brutality, for example, in order to get 
African Americans to feel too disillusioned to show up to vote.146 Dugin postulated that by 
highlighting existing fractures in American society, covert Russian influencers could turn 
America in on itself, causing it to self-cannibalize until it manufactured its own demise.  
In the last two decades since Foundations was published, Russia has made significant 
strides in accomplishing the plan for domination outlined by Dugin. Though Dugin’s work does 
not necessarily speak for Putin’s intentions, it does provide an accurate picture of the goals 
outlined to establishment and military leaders in terms of propelling Russia back onto the global 
arena. It provides context for the environment within which Putin crafted the Russian cyberattack 
campaigns that proliferated the last decade. In Russian political and military circles, figures at 
least have been taught a defined path to avenge Russia’s humiliation at the end of the 19th 
century by fostering Russian alliances with key countries, breaking up pre-existing international 
coalitions, and destroying “Atlantic” powers of Britain and the US by severing Britain from the 
EU and exploiting social divisions in the US.  
 
The Trace Evidence of Putin’s Worldview 
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Russia suffered a string of humiliations over the last two decades. Its leader since 1996, 
Vladimir Putin, a man now synonymous with his country, felt the geopolitical events that 
damaged Russia as resounding blows to his own person. Hillary Clinton described how she 
understands the world through Putin’s eyes from a story he once told her. In this story, a ragged 
man returns home from the War, stumbling through the streets to finally return home to his 
family. It was not unusual at the time for bombings and airstrikes to rattle the town, so he was 
not shocked to see a pile of bodies in the street from an explosion soon before he arrived. 
However, he was stunned to see a shoe poking out of the pile, his wife’s shoe. The man becomes 
frantic, yelling “that’s my wife! That’s my wife’s shoe!” as he scrambled to extricate his wife’s 
seemingly lifeless body from the rubble. Guards carrying rifles yelled at him, trying to shoo him 
away. But at last he was able to break away with his wife’s body, carrying her back to their 
apartment in the outskirts of the city. From there he nursed the woman back from the brink of 
death, and two years later, she gave birth to her oldest son, named Vladimir Putin. Hillary 
Clinton believed that in Putin’s origin story, he saw himself as his father, and Mother Russia as 
his mother. All but left for dead in the rubble left behind by a crippling war, Putin saw himself as 
espying the valuable and still flickering light in Russia, fighting to dig it out of the rubble and 
bring it back to its former glory.147  
 Little is known about Putin’s early childhood. He provided for his young family through 
his station as a Russian Intelligence officer through its intelligence institution at the time, the 
“KGB.” The KGB stationed Putin in Eastern Germany in the 1980’s, which was a relatively 
unglamorous post. While Western German cities like Berlin were filled with intrigue and 
responsibility for KGB officers, Eastern Germany proved more stagnant. However, this post 
                                               
147 Clinton, Hillary. Active Measures. Directed by Jack Bryan. August 31, 2018. 
70 
 
crucially centered Putin’s life at the time around a divided Germany, embodied by the Berlin 
Wall.148  
East Germany benefited from its proximity to West Germany, and was prodded along the 
way towards economic recovery post 1996. However, the fragmented USSR rapidly descended 
into maddened chaos, with vast sections of the former country’s wealth being cordoned off to a 
few oligarchs with powerful connections. In the frenzy, all hope of achieving a democratic 
solution in post-USSR states dissolved, with graft and desperation filling the void of the 
fragmented bureaucracy. A handful of oligarchs who were at the right place at the right time 
cemented for themselves and their posterity lifetimes of unimaginable wealth. Meanwhile, the 
rest of post-USSR citizens watched their life savings and their public institutions crumble to 
dust, launching their futures into uncertainty and existential peril.149  
Though the communist experiment was flawed, it did provide Russians with a reliable 
social safety net and the idea that the society as a whole would never allow one of its members to 
fail. The dissolution of the USSR turned this reassurance on its head, often pitting neighbor 
against neighbor, sowing mistrust and disgust in Russians for their homeland, Russia. The 
bedlam and embarrassment that Russians saw in their day-to-day reality they also saw abounding 
within the top echelons of power in Russia. Russians, notably Putin, felt deeply ashamed of their 
new president, Boris Yeltsen, who was roundly considered incompetent at policy matters and a 
bumbling drunk in person. Unfortunate incidents like the alcoholic president falling off a stage at 
a press appearance with American President Bill Clinton struck an even deeper chord for 
Russians, symbolizing the stunning disgrace that Russia found itself in.150  
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Putin was traumatized, along with the rest of his countrymen, by Russia’s relatively 
sudden fall from grace. While the rest of the world might reflect on the fall of the Berlin Wall as 
a triumphant moment in history, Putin saw its collapse as one of the greatest tragedies of the 21st 
century. He endeavored to restore Russia to its former global standing, and cunningly navigated 
the somewhat boozy and corrupt bureaucracy to reach the station of the Presidency in 1996. 
Beyond a period of four years in which Putin engaged in presidential powers through the role of 
the Prime Minister with a close ally as the puppet-President from 2004-2008, Putin has 
controlled Russia as its President for decades.  
Through this era of Putin at the helm of Russia, the country has switched directions from 
its western-embracing style under Yeltsin to an effective autocracy. A network of oligarchs 
dutiful to Putin control vast sections of the country’s resources, with government interactions 
notable for their money-for-action nature. With Putin holding the purse strings of the network of 
oligarchs’ vast collections of wealth, some financial publications like Forbes consider Putin as 
the wealthiest man on earth. As Putin said in a 2008 press conference, however, “the worst 
addiction of all is power.”151 Though Putin lives and works from a series of imperial palaces, 
critiques of his Presidency focus more on his brash grabs for power rather than a compulsion for 
money.  
Such jolts to amass power include jailing protesters in 2004, jailing journalists beginning 
in 2005, allegedly ordering the assassinations of journalists in 2008, allegedly ordering the 
planting of bombs and execution of terror attacks throughout Moscow during his first week as 
President to instigate an increased appropriation of Presidential power in 2004, allegedly 
ordering the assassinations of political adversaries in Russia and Ukraine, using the army to quell 
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uprisings in Russia during the Orange Revolution of 2004, killing 25, and as a continuation of 
the Arab Spring in 2008, killing 26.152 Under his control, independent election auditors have 
downgraded the election purity to the qualification of being of dubious certainty, in other words, 
as rigged. Subsequently, Putin jailed independent election auditors. Additional grabs to power 
include a war with Georgia in 2008, the support of Syrian despot Assad, recruiting Ukranian 
scientists to increase its collection of nuclear weapons, and more.  
In the period of international policy under President Barack Obama and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in 2004-2010, Putin was known as a consistent bad actor. However, Russia 
itself was not commonly regarded as a significant threat. In fact, in the third nationally 
broadcasted presidential debate of 2010 between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, Obama dealt 
what was subsequently called the death blow to the Romney campaign, casting him as so 
cataclysmically out of touch that his run for president never recovered. In the debate, Obama 
mentioned a quote from Romney’s book written in 2010, with Obama saying, “when you were 
asked, what’s the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said ‘Russia.’ Not Al-Qaeda; 
you said Russia. And, the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back, because, the 
Cold War’s been over for 20 years.”153 The attack sucked the air out of the room, leaving 
Romney stuttering and the audience compelled in Obama’s favor.  
Regardless of whether Russia was actually a significant geopolitical threat to the United 
States in 2010, the crux of the matter is that the idea of Russia as a meaningful force in Western 
life was laughable, and so preposterous that it sealed a bid for Presidency. Putin became notably 
enraged when Obama called Russia a regional force in 2010, alluding to Russia having minimal 
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and contained power, not forceful enough to bear much relevance to the United States. Once a 
global superpower vying for power neck-in-neck with the United States, Russia, with Putin at its 
helm, was laughed off, the butt of the joke in the 21st century. These slights were not military 
attacks on Russia’s geopolitical integrity, but were similarly shattering for Russia’s stuttering 
social psyche. Russia no longer faced the existential peril omnipresent the previous war-addled 
century, but it faced the loss of its relevance, potency, and national spirit.  
From the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the “regional power” comment, Putin’s 
legitimacy went through several humiliations. Putin’s regime became the object of scandal in the 
fallouts of the Panama Papers and Olympic doping scandal.154 Putin publicly described these 
scandals as American-led efforts to smear Russia’s reputation. One motive for Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 US presidential election was Putin’s embarrassment about these 
scandals, and his desire to unearth similarly damning information on US politicians and the US 
political process. In theory, these revelations might exact an eye-for-an-eye type justice, and 
show the hypocrisy Putin saw as latent in the US.  
 
Putin’s Vendetta for Clinton 
 
Putin aimed to discredit Clinton in the way he felt his leadership was threatened by her.  
Putin publicly asserted that Clinton organized the mass protests that threatened his regime in 
2011 and 2012, during the Arab Spring.  These attacks sought to fulfill Putin’s personal agendas: 
personal vindication for perceived misdeeds done to Putin’s legitimacy by Hillary Clinton, as 
well as a personal preference for Trump and his political strategy. The report ties Russia’s 
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attacks to Putin’s public claims that then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton riled up the Russian 
people and turned them against then-Prime Minister Putin.  
Russia’s leadership experienced “mass protests against his [Prime Minister Putin and his 
close associate, President Dmitry Medvedev] regime in late 2011 and early 2012.”155 The global 
climate boiled in 2010 as the Arab Spring spread throughout Eurasia.156 Putin faced an 
unprecedented scale and fervor of political protests since he first gained leadership a decade 
prior. Both domestic and international public opinion turned sour after parliamentary elections 
that left Putin’s party -United Russia- extremely vulnerable. 
Putin publicly claimed that Clinton questioned the honesty and fairness of the election 
results before she had personally seen them. In doing so, Putin said, “she set the tone for some 
actors in our country and gave them a signal. They heard the signal and with the support of the 
U.S. State Department began active work.”157 Putin perceived Clinton as inciting the protesters 
and contributing to the funding of Putin’s opposition. Despite numerous claims of campaign 
abuses, ballot meddling, and electoral fraud, United Russia’s opposition nearly toppled Putin’s 
party’s majority. With Putin and his party already in a vulnerable position, protesters decried 
Putin and the election in demonstrations and on social media. Perhaps to avoid the full-blown 
revolutions unfurling in neighboring countries, Russian authorities stifled unrest by arresting 
hundreds of protesters, equipping police officers with riot gear, and flooding public squares with 
pro-Putin counter-protesters. 
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When questioned by the press five days after the Russian election, Clinton did not 
personally mention Putin. She said that the United States valued its relationship with Russia, but 
“at the same time, the United States and many others around the world have a strong 
commitment to democracy and human rights. It’s part of who we are. It’s our values. And we 
expressed concerns that we thought were well founded about the conduct of the elections. And 
we are supportive of the rights and aspirations of the Russian people to be able to make progress 
and to realize a better future for themselves, and we hope to see that unfold in the years 
ahead.”158  This comment by Clinton was one of several that Putin perceived as downplaying the 
legitimacy and esteem of Putin.159 It added to a growing list of grievances of Putin towards the 
US’s superciliousness about democracy, the Obama presidency, the potentially hollow nature of 
the campaign for a “reset with Russia,” and with Secretary of State Clinton in particular. 
Another portentous moment was the Libyan revolution, resulting in the violent and 
video-recorded murder of its dictator, Moamar Gaddafi, in October of 2011. The video horrified 
Putin, who replayed the video of the mob’s assault several times.160 A US intelligence 
assessment concluded that the video deeply impacted Putin, who blamed himself for not 
protecting Gaddafi better. In contrast, between televised interviews Clinton famously laughed 
and proclaimed, “we came, we saw, he died” upon hearing unconfirmed reports of Gaddafi’s 
death.161 The murder of Gaddafi and several of his family members occurred two months before 
the highly contested elections in Russia. The geopolitical events occurring in 2011 provide a 
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more complete picture of the fears and animosities growing with Russia’s newfound 
vulnerability, and the United States’ persistent boldness. 
 
Putin’s Scheme for After the Election 
 
Putin, like most others, anticipated that Clinton would win the Presidency in 2016. 
Therefore, in the months prior to the election, Russia’s troll farms prepared a barrage of tweets 
and social media accounts focused on the illegitimacy of Clinton’s presidency and her “rigged” 
and “unfair” victory.162 Russia directed its efforts on undercutting her anticipated victory, 
seeking to rile political upheaval during the vulnerable transfer of power process. It is difficult to 
overstate the onslaught that would have proceeded after an election victory for Clinton.  
According to the DNI report, a few months before the election, when it appeared likely 
that Clinton would be the next president, Putin redirected the influence campaign towards 
“undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and crippling her presidency from its start, 
including by impugning the fairness of the election. Before the election, Russian diplomats had 
publicly denounced the US electoral process and were prepared to publicly call into question the 
validity of the results. Pro-Kremlin bloggers had prepared a Twitter campaign, #DemocracyRIP, 
on election night in anticipation of Secretary Clinton’s victory.”163 The force that carried the 
news coverage and public uproar about Clinton’s private email server, role in the Benghazi 
consulate attack, and favor she received from the Democratic National Convention over her 
competing Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders, would have continued to imperil the legitimacy 
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of her leadership, along with the new charge of having rigged her presidency as part of a 
powerful, coastal, liberal elite with sprawling control over rural, real America. A sizeable 
American opposition of Clinton, a Russian troll army, FBI Director James Comey’s public 
upbraid of Clinton, and a Republican-controlled House of Representatives and Senate spelled a 
challenging presidential term for Clinton.  
However, Trump won, to Moscow and the rest of the world’s surprise. Putin halted the 
negative publicity aimed at the US election, clearly anticipating to derive so much benefit from a 
Trump presidency that it was worth cooperating with the Trump White House and scrapping all 
the media scorn pre-ready to decry the “rigged election.” Putin anticipated a Clinton victory, and 
he planned to use her victory to accomplish two goals: denigrate Clinton’s legitimacy and 
destabilize the democratic system. When Trump won, Putin could have continued on with the 
latter half of his plan, to destabilize the democratic system by tasking his troll army to churn out 
allegations that the US conducted a rigged or unfair election in 2016.164 Putin could not attack 
Clinton’s legitimacy because she emerged from the election with no title, but he chose not to 
lambast the election system. Putin sacrificed the latter half of his plan because he thought he 
could so benefit from a Trump presidency that it was not worth taking the shot at the US in its 
moment of political vulnerability and tumult. Putin expected to earn more from a Trump 
presidency than he would gain by finishing his years-long plan and decrying a US election’s 
fairness.  
 
Putin’s Preference for Trump 
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Aside from Putin’s renowned personal dislike and perhaps intimidation by Clinton, Putin 
maintained some political reasons to support one of her opponents in the 2016 presidential 
election, Donald Trump. The DNI report mentions that Putin likely avoided openly endorsing 
Trump out of a fear that a Kremlin endorsement would push US voters away from Trump. 
However, Putin and officials in his political orbit championed Trump’s willingness to collaborate 
with Russia, as opposed to Clinton’s “aggressive rhetoric.”165 
         Putin knew Clinton’s stance on foreign policy and anti-terrorism coalitions from their 
interactions during the Obama presidencies. Trump took a hard stance on terrorism, often 
speaking in unequivocal terms about the need to rid the world of all terrorist cells using any 
means necessary. According to journalist Seymour M. Hersh, a White House insider with 
connections to dealings with Russia said “before 9/11 Putin ‘used to say to us: “We have the 
same nightmares about different places.” He was referring to his problems with the caliphate in 
Chechnya and our early issues with al-Qaida.’”166 Putin maintained a compelling interest in 
extreme measures to counter terrorism in Russia and its surrounding region. Putin saw a Trump 
presidency as more conducive to forming a coalition to fight Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) in Eurasia.167 The civil war embroiling Syria frightened and motivated Putin. Putin feared 
Russia’s proximity to the growing Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its strongholds 
in Syria, and saw Trump’s strongman foreign policy stance as more likely to produce bold anti-
terrorism measures, like creating an international counterterrorism coalition.  
         Putin’s political orbit consists of an oligarchy of Russian families with business and 
political connections that push a pro-Putin agenda when desired. Putin, in the language of the 
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DNI report, “has had many positive experiences working with Western political leaders whose 
business interests made them more disposed to deal with Russia, such as former Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.”168  
 Additionally, to journalist Oliver Bullough, a key reason why the governments of post-
Soviet Union nations developed not into democracies, but “authoritarian governments... 
dominated by these anti-democratic elites, these kleptocrats, oligarchs, people who really stole a 
huge amount of the country’s resources,”169 was the anti-democratic ability for a certain class of 
citizens to hoard money through offshore bank accounts, shell corporations, and embezzlement 
of government funds. Bullough contends that these schemes aimed to grant privileged citizens an 
exception from the foundational social contract- that a citizenry pays taxes in exchange for goods 
and services provided for the benefit of the citizenry living in that country.  
However, the privileged citizens still want to enjoy the benefits provided by the group’s 
taxes, but just to not have to contribute as an individual. To Bullough, this stolen money 
counterweights the social balance maintained through democracy, tipping the scales against 
oversight and equality in government.170 With the US as one of the most popular destinations for 
storing stolen international funds due to its simple process for setting up shell companies and its 
low default risk, and with Russian oligarchs having perfected the process for stealing and 
siphoning off national funds into more private, secure locations, Putin and his oligarchs likely 
felt concern about the policies Clinton would set under her administration.  
Trump notoriously refused to follow precedent to release his personal tax returns, later 
suing US House Democrats and Trump’s accounting firm to prevent them from being obtained 
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through the House’s subpoena. In a televised presidential debate, after candidate Clinton accused 
Trump of not paying federal income tax, Trump replied “that makes me smart.”171 Trump 
embraces the anti-democratic philosophy used by Putin and the Russian oligarchy to justify 
taking national funds for personal gain, and them transferring them out of the national market 
through financial tricks to hide the stolen funds and make them more difficult for them to be 
retrieved. Trump’s statements imply that the Kremlin’s funds would stay safe in the US.  
 
Putin’s Plan for Democracy 
 
The influence campaign also sought to achieve the national interest of raising Russia’s 
domestic and global esteem. The morally superior reactions to Russian elections, especially as 
Putin extended his reign over the span of decades, threatened Putin’s legitimacy at home and 
abroad. According to the DNI report, Putin and those in his political orbit see the “promotion” of 
the “US-led liberal democratic order” as antithetical to the advancement and success of Putin and 
Russia’s power.172 Also, with viral YouTube videos depicting blatant ballot tampering, as well as 
reports from election security officials from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe describing outright election fraud, the promotion of democratic ideals jeopardizes the 
legitimacy of the current leadership regime in Russia. 173 
         Additionally, according to the DNI report, other damaging moments for Putin came from 
the release of the “Panama Papers” and evidence of the doping scandal that embarrassingly 
changed the narrative for Russia and Sochi’s home Olympic games. Putin perceived these 
                                               
171 Reilly, Katie. “New York Is Trying to Release Trump's State Tax Returns. Here's Why That Might Not Work” 
Time Politics. April 10, 2019. 
172“Assessing Russia’s Actions” 
173 Schwartz, Michael and Herszenhorn, David M. “In Russia” 
81 
 
revelations as events organized by the United States in an effort to malign Russia. These 
instances of leaked or hacked information that damaged faith in Russia’s political system bear 
striking similarity to ensuing hacks of the Democratic National Committee emails in the lead-up 
to the 2016 election.   
 
Promoting Far-Right Candidates 
 
 During the run-up to the elections in 2014-2016 in France, Germany, the Brexit 
referendum in Great Britain, the United States, some noted a sharp increase in far-right or alt-
right sentiment.174 Political candidates like Marine le Penn of France campaigned on a platform 
of anti-globalism, xenophobia, and conservatism. Each of the alt-right candidates or campaigns 
obtained some support from Putin. Though he held back from directly endorsing some 
candidates for fear this would actually turn potential voters away, Putin often provided financial 
support, directed his social media army to their aid, or leaked damaging information about their 
opponents.  
 Potentially, Putin responded in this way to alt-right candidates for two reasons. One, 
because he wants to show the hypocrisy of democratic countries for claiming moral high-ground 
but acting the same, behind closed doors, as the governments they oppose. Second, Putin wants 
to change the international perception of democracy so that Russians and people in democratic 
countries believe that all elections are “rigged,” all politicians can be bought, and that there is no 
such thing as a country with honest politics and politicians. This would serve to demote the 
notion of democracy and truth, and decrease the potential for dissatisfaction within Russia out of 
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comparison to Western countries. Third, Putin aims to tarnish or destroy the role of “values” and 
liberal ideals in international politics. According to journalist and former Moscow Bureau Chief 
for the Guarding, Luke Harding, Putin resents what he sees as trivial or disingenuous protests by 
the West about the Russian government’s record on human rights and democratic ideals. He 
wishes to return to the 19th century Imperial Era, where hegemonic global powers met to discuss 
the divisions of land and money, with little importance placed on discussing journalist 
assassinations or a country’s political prisoners.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The story of Russian interference in the 2016 US election system is not one of a mighty 
and competent country led by a mastermind to fix a US election. The story is of this strange 
moment in time, where the third great social revolution- the information revolution, following 
the agricultural and industrial revolutions- charges forward like a tsunami, fundamentally 
changing the way that humans operate and relate to one another.175 Within the span of many 
people’s lifetimes, information technology (IT) has drastically altered the way people do 
business, spend leisure time, and recently: the way countries conduct governance and the way 
they wage war.  
Within the last decade, China utilized IT to develop an Orwellian surveillance state, 
forming a government that almost constantly monitors its citizens’ activity. Also in that time 
                                               
175 Yoneji Masuda (1985) Three Great Social Revolutions: Agricultural, Industrial, and Informational, Prometheus, 
3:2, 269-274, DOI: 10.1080/08109028508628999 
 
 
83 
 
period, Russia has conducted cyberoperations on over a dozen countries. Over a decade ago, the 
tiny but techy country of Estonia switched to online elections. IT weaved itself into the basic 
functions of government is the inescapable reality of this period of time. Currently, countries 
take part in an even more expansive Space Race- the race to develop the most impenetrable 
government servers, the best environments to attract technology development and talent, to claim 
market-share of technological products like 5G internet, to amass the largest data stores, and to 
develop the best cyberweapons. This IT Race will crown the next global superpowers.  
How the United States chooses to respond to this challenge, which was epitomized with 
Russia’s interference in its election system, sets the trajectory for its future. As distressing as the 
Trump administration’s ties to Russia are, there are several more pressing issues exposed by 
Russia’s interference. How should a government police and monitor the online activity of its 
own citizens? How should it do so for foreign allies, or for foreign enemies? How do we 
incorporate the Constitution and foundational American principles into cyberspace? What are 
effective diplomatic responses to cyberattacks? How can we buffer our national defenses against 
cyberattacks, propaganda, and fake news? Countries like Italy have responded to fake news 
corrupting their elections by teaching how to identify legitimate information to students in 
school. Countries like Russia have embraced the promise of Artificial Intelligence by 
incorporating AI in school curriculums. How will the US respond? 
According to cybersecurity and intelligence journalist Dustin Volz, “Russia is the 
hurricane, but China is global warming,” meaning that Russia conducted a damaging and serious 
attack on US cyberspace, but China poses an imminent, systemic threat to the way of life in the 
US and abroad. Russian interference bears importance because of the damage it did and the 
vulnerabilities it exposed in the US, and because it forced the US to confront the ongoing threat 
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of cyberwarfare technology aimed at the US and other democratic systems. The tactics Russia 
used to interfere in the US 2016 election will reoccur, according to American national security 
experts. But other adversaries of the US, like China or Iran, could also exploit these tactics, or 
more sophisticated ones, on the US and its allies. Americans citizens or US companies could 
engage in technological homegrown-terrorism, using Russia’s tactics on fellow Americans.  
The even larger issue at hand is that, in the words of from the Edward Lucas, Senior VP 
at Center for European Policy Analysis, “what is true both of what we loosely call the 
cyberworld and the intelligence world is that open societies have a disadvantage and closed 
societies like China have an advantage.”176 Democratic countries exerting less control over the 
Internet maintain the risk of foreign enemies filling that vacuum of control with their tactics for 
using the online space to manipulate and take advantage of its users. China has demonstrated an 
interest in expanding its IT control globally, pitching its surveillance system to a group of world 
leaders during the Beijing Olympics in 2012. Its frenzied effort to install the “5G” internet 
framework in African countries portends a showdown in the future between the incumbent 
global superpower of the US, leading the liberal democratic order, and the challenging global 
superpower of China, and its network of closed societies interconnected through Chinese IT. In 
this looming clash, where closed societies hold the advantage of unfettered access to the group’s 
technology and data, how will the liberal-democratic order protect democracy to survive the 
advent of non-democratic machines? 
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